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WHEN PUSH COMES TO SHOVE BETWEEN
COURT RULE AND STATUTE: THE ROLE OF




Who decides whether electronic recording technology may
be used to make the verbatim record of court proceedings?
(a) judges; (b) litigants; (c) administrators; (d) legislators;
(e) court reporters.
The correct answer in California is: (e) court reporters.
The California Court Reporters Association recently sued the
California Judicial Council to invalidate rules of court that
would have given local superior courts discretion to use elec-
tronic recording technology. These rules would allow a verba-
tim record to be made when an official reporter is unavailable
or when the parties do not object. In 1995, in California
Court Reporters Association, Inc., v. Judicial Council of Cali-
fornia ("CCRA 1"), a state appellate court held that these
rules were "inconsistent with statute," and therefore exceeded
the Judicial Council's rule-making powers under Article VI,
Section 6 of the California Constitution.2 This decision exem-
plifies the stranglehold that the court reporters' lobby has
* Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law. J.D., Har-
vard Law School; A.B., City College of New York. Grateful acknowledgement is
extended to my former colleague, Professor Susan Keller, and current col-
leagues, Professors Michael Schwartz and Edith Warkentine, who provided in-
valuable emotional and intellectual support during the lengthy gestation of this
article. Thanks also go to my two capable research assistants, Richard Helms,
John Palmer, and Andrew Struve.
1. California Court Reporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 44 (Ct. App. 1995), affd, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997) [hereinafter
CCRA I].
2. Id. at 51.
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over the legislative process and significantly impairs the Ju-
dicial Council's role in court administration. The CCRA I
opinion has seismic implications for court administration in
California, raising the larger issue of the appropriate role of
appellate judges in interpreting statutory and constitutional
text regarding the power over court administration.
Judges wear two hats. Traditionally, they are adjudica-
tors on the trial and appellate levels, deciding cases one at a
time. Judges also perform the extra-judicial function of man-
aging court operations,3 a role that has blossomed in the last
half of the twentieth century. The protracted battle in Cali-
fornia between the court reporters and judicial administra-
tors over the use of electronic recording in superior courts
ended with a victory for the court reporters that reduced the
rule-making power of the Judicial Council in court admini-
stration. Ironically, the hand that delivered this blow to the
judiciary's administrative power was attached to the judici-
ary's decision-making arm. The CCRA I court interpreted a
collection of court reporting statutes to mean "that the Leg-
islature implicitly intended [the court record] be made by cer-
tified shorthand reporters rather than by electronic record-
ing. '4 In the process, the CCRA I court re-calibrated the
balance of power in court administration between the judicial
and legislative branches in California. The CCRA I decision
raises important questions about the relationship between
the decisional and administrative roles judges play in court
administration. Part II of this article tells the tale of this
struggle for control of the court record and lays the ground-
work for an exploration of the relationship between the roles
of judges as interpreters of text and as court administrators.5
Much has been written about the traditional role of
3. See, e.g., Carl Baar, When Judges Lobby: Congress and Court Admini-
stration 4 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file
with the Department of Political Science at University of Chicago). Baar's study
distinguishes between "judicial administration" and "judicial decision-making":
Judicial decision-making focuses upon the process of litigation-that is,
the hearing and resolving of cases brought by aggrieved parties in ac-
cordance with traditional legal procedures. On the other hand, judicial
administration refers to the way in which the process of litigation is or-
ganized-how courts are established, staffed and operated so that cases
can be efficiently heard and resolved.
Id.
4. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51.
5. See infra Part II.
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judges as adjudicators who shape the evolving common law
and interpret statutes. Less has been written about the con-
temporary-extra-judicial-role of judges as court adminis-
trators. This article links these two roles, focusing on the im-
pact judges as adjudicators have on the role of judges as court
administrators.
Courts need to update their theories of statutory inter-
pretation to keep up with dramatic developments in judicial
administration. Part III of this article briefly surveys the rise
of judicial branch leadership in court administration in the
twentieth century.6 During the last thirty years, judicial in-
volvement in court administration has rapidly evolved in re-
sponse to increased caseloads, the technology revolution,7 and
budget crises.8  The development of centralized judicial
branch administrative authorities within state and federal
judicial systems, replete with staffs of professional court ad-
ministrators,9 has reversed the traditional dependence of the
judiciary on the other two branches of government.' °
At the same time, these last few decades have also wit-
nessed political assaults on the judiciary that have eroded re-
spect for the constitutional concept of separation of powers
and judicial independence. Judges have been the targets of
unprecedented attacks for their substantive law decisions."
In the procedural area as well, court administration has be-
come increasingly politicized as interest groups increasingly
turn to the legislative branch to bend the rules of practice,
6. See infra Part III.
7. See Fredric I. Lederer, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium: Chang-
ing Litigation with Science and Technology: Technology Comes to the Court-
room, and..., 43 EMORY L.J. 1095 (1994) ("Our increasing dependence on tech-
nology, particularly computer-based technology, is one of the distinguishing
characteristics of late twentieth century American life.").
8. See, e.g., John K. Hudzik, Financing and Managing the Finances of the
California Court System: Alternative Futures, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1813, 1840
(1993) ("Under all except the 'probable best case scenario,' the next decade's
likely funding levels will put increasing pressure on the management of judicial
system resources.").
9. See infra text accompanying note 120.
10. See RUSSELL R. WHEELER, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: ITS RELATION TO
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 37 (1988) ("A separate and effective judicial admini-
stration capability... stand[s] to provide the judiciary the strength to protect
its independence, 'to defend itself against [the] attacks' of the other branches.").
11. See, e.g., Nancy McCarthy, Judge Faces Discipline for Opinion, CAL. B.J.
Aug. 1998, at 1.
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procedure, and court administration in their favor.12 The
CCRA I decision enabled powerful interest groups to ham-
string judicial administration for private ends.
The convergence of recent historic changes in three ar-
eas-court administration, technology, and statutory inter-
pretation theory-is rendering obsolete the application of tra-
ditional interpretative approaches when applied to statutory
and constitutional text that affect court administration. The
courts, as protectors of public values,"3 need to assume an as-
sertive role as interpreters of statutes that support, rather
than undermine, their assertive role in court administration.
The legal community engages in an ongoing conversation
about the appropriate function of judicial administration.'
Courts, as interpreters, have a voice in this ongoing dialogue"5
12. For a description of the politicization of procedure, see WHEELER, supra
note 10, at 39. "The potential of legislative dominance of the judiciary is inher-
ent in the nature of republican government." Id. at 39. See also Glenn S. Kop-
pel, Populism, Politics, and Procedure: The Saga of Summary Judgment and the
Rulemaking Process in California, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 455, 471-87 (1997). But see,
e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST-FEDERAL JUDGES AND
COURT ADMINISTRATION, 133-34 (1995) (scholars encourage Congress to be less
deferential to the courts, fearing judicial arrogance):
[E]xcessive [Congressional] deference to federal judges amounts to ab-
dication of the Congress's Article III responsibilities for designing and
maintaining the federal court system.... By being more attentive to
the resource problems facing the judiciary and by overseeing judicial
administration in a more critical and less deferential fashion, Congress,
with the assistance of input from scholars and interested groups, may
be able to moderate the potentially detrimental risks attendant to
manifestations ofjudicial self-interest.
Id.
13. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1062-73 (1989) (analyzing the role of courts as protectors of
public values) [hereinafter Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation].
14. See, e.g., WHEELER, supra note 10, at 34.
15. Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 13, at
1016.
Public values thinkers believe that the dialogue by which public values
are articulated is best performed by courts, not just by the legislature
.... Modern political science scholarship depicts the legislature as
typically paralyzed and unable to take constructive action, when it does
bestir itself to enact laws, they are typically feeble compromises or,
worse, unprincipled doles to special interest groups .... Courts have
the institutional ability to contribute more substantially to the politics
of public values, because their independence reduces the inertia and in-
terest group pressures of everyday politics, and because their open,
reasoned, and incremental decision-making assures a more rational
discussion of public issues.
WHEN PUSH COMES TO SHOVE
about the appropriate balance of power between the judicial
and legislative branches in court administration. Part IV
draws upon recent statutory interpretation scholarship to cri-
tique the application of traditional "legislative intent" ap-
proaches to interpreting statutes bearing on court admini-
stration and proposes an alternative approach.16 Part V
critiques the CCRA I decision to illustrate how courts could
use the proposed alternative approach to resolve conflict be-
tween court rule and statute.
1 7
II. CALIFORNIA COURT REPORTERS VERSUS THE
JUDICIAL COUNCIL
A. A Historical Perspective: The Evolution of Verbatim Court
Reporting
Stenographers rarely made verbatim records of court
proceedings in the United States prior to the Civil War."8 Un-
til the mid-nineteenth century, verbatim records of trial pro-
ceedings were scarce. 9 American courts did not appoint ste-
nographers as salaried court employees until April 16, 1860,
when the New York State legislature enacted the first statute
authorizing a court to appoint a court reporter."0 California
followed New York's lead the following year, enacting a law
authorizing, but not requiring, judges to appoint shorthand
reporters.' The text of the original 1861 California court re-
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. The first system of modern shorthand was invented in Elizabethan
England by Dr. Timothy Bright who, in 1588, published a treatise entitled
"Characterie An Arte of shorte, swifte, and secrete writing by Character." For a
history of court reporting in England, see Harry M. Scharf, The Court Reporter,
10 J. OF LEGAL HIST. 191-227 (Sept. 1989). Phonography was imported from
England to the United States in 1845. See JULIUS E. ROCKWELL, THE
TEACHING, PRACTICE AND LITERATURE OF SHORTHAND 35 (1884). See also Os-
wald M. T. Ratteray, Verbatim Reporting Comes of Age, 56 JUDICATURE 368
(1973).
19. See Jim Haviland, Philander Deming's Role, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 12, 1982,
at 15, 15 ("Until just after the Civil War, testimony wasn't recorded in trials.
This led to considerable wrangling over the different recollections of what had
been said by witnesses in court.").
20. ROCKWELL, supra note 18, at 46. As late as 1944, federal courts did not
employ court reporters. Parties who desired a verbatim record made their own
private arrangements to hire a reporter. See PETER GRAHAM FISH, POLITICS OF
FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 230 (1973).
21. Chapter 434 of the Statutes of California of 1861 provided, in relevant
1999]
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porter statute remains substantially intact in the current
versions of Code of Civil Procedure sections 269 and 273 and
Government Code section 69941, which were the key code
sections interpreted by the CCRA I court.
While no legislative history survives to illuminate the
purpose behind the early court reporter statutes," it is fair to
infer that these statutes, enacted during the infancy of court
reporting,23 were designed to address a shortage of stenogra-
phers sufficiently skilled in the infant art of making a verba-
tim record of court proceedings. 4 It is reasonable to assume
that competent court reporters were especially scarce in fron-
tier California. Further, the early statutes were most likely
part:
Section 1. The District Judge of each of the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
Tenth, Twelfth, and Fifteenth, Judicial Districts, is hereby authorized
to appoint a competent Short Hand Reporter, who shall, at the request
of either party in a civil case, or in criminal cases, triable in the District
Court, at the request of the court, take down in short hand, the rulings
of the court, the exceptions taken, and the testimony, and shall within
five days after the trail of such case, write out the same in plain, legi-
ble, long, handwriting, and file it, together with the original short
handwriting, with the Clerk of the court in which the cause was tried.
Id.
22. See Letter from Legislative Intent Service to Glenn S. Koppel, Professor,
Western State University 3 (July 1, 1997) (on file with author) ("As you review
the materials we located for the legislation of the 1860's, you will find no sub-
stantive discussion of the background or intent of the measures. Unfortunately,
none was left by the author, Governor, the committees, nor the state entities
that were concerned with the legislation.").
23. See ROCKWELL, supra note 18, at 54 ("[N]o able or systematic efforts
were made towards the formation of State or national [shorthand] associations
until the centennial year [1876]."). See also Ratteray, supra note 18, at 369
("Professionalism among reporters... increased at the close of the [19th] cen-
tury. There was a decline in the fierce rivalry between the exponents of differ-
ing systems of shorthand during the previous two hundred years.").
24. "Many transcripts of this period [early to mid-nineteenth century] ...
show evidence of considerable condensation and gaps in the reporter's notes
that were subsequently filled in. In many instances the reporters were probably
not skilled enough to record every word." Ratteray, supra note 18, at 368 (foot-
note omitted). The shortage of skilled court reporters continues to challenge
court administrators and is a major reason for the popularity of electronic re-
cording. See William E. Hewitt, Video Court Reporting: A Primer for Trial and
Appellate Judges, JUDGES' J., Winter 1992, at 4.
One or more of the following reasons ... will be mentioned [by judges
to explain why they sought alternatives to traditional reporting]: (1)
there was a shortage of qualified court reporters and finding alterna-
tives became a necessity; (2) there was a problem with timeliness of
transcripts, quality of transcripts, or both; [and] (3) there was a finan-
cial crisis and the court had to save money.
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designed to make available, at the option of the courts or the
parties, an assured, quality source of the only available ver-
batim recording technology-shorthand. Consequently, Cali-
fornia's 1861 court reporter statute merely "authorized," but
did not require, selected superior court judges to appoint
shorthand reporters and required the court reporter to take
down proceedings only "at the request of either party in a civil
case, or in criminal cases, triable in the District Court, at the
request of the court."25 This statutory scheme remains the
same today.26
However, many litigants in contemporary court proceed-
ings in California do not request the creation of a verbatim
record as, for example, in cases where appeals are unlikely or
the proceedings are not complicated and can be recreated by
"settling the record." 7
During the mid-twentieth century, electronic and infor-
mation technology radically transformed verbatim recording
methods. Courts began to experiment with sound recording
as early as the 1950s, followed by audio-video recording in the
1980s. As judicial caseloads ballooned, the use of electronic
recording grew from an experiment to a common practice and
the supply of court reporters proved unequal to the demand. 8
Because of the rapid evolution of verbatim recording
technology, court reporting statutes are a genre of court ad-
ministration statutes that quickly become outdated unless
updated by the legislature. Court reporter associations, who
fear the demise of shorthand reporting, vigorously oppose the
use of electronic non-shorthand verbatim recording technolo-
gies.29 In California and New York, where the legislatures
exercise power over court administration concurrently with
the courts, ° court reporter lobbyists successfully blocked ef-
forts by court administrators to enact statutes expressly
Id.
25. 1861 Cal. Stat. 434.
26. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 269(a) (West Supp. 1999); CAL GOV'T CODE
§ 69941 (West Supp. 1999).
27. See CAL. R. CT., tit. 1, app. R.
28. See Court Reporting: From Stenography to Technology, GOV'T TECH.,
Mar. 1996, at 1 ("Overloaded and underfunded courts are increasingly looking
at audio recording as a way to cut costs, which is achieved mainly by eliminat-
ing the salaries and related costs of court reporters.").
29. See Hewitt, supra note 24, at 5.
30. See infra note 131.
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authorizing the general use of electronic recording in court.3'
Notwithstanding the forceful opposition of the court re-
porters, electronic recording technology has proven to be an
acceptable means for making the record," though not the best
31. However, there is one advanced verbatim reporting technology that has
been enthusiastically embraced by the court reporting profession: computer
aided transcription ("CAT"). CAT, a marriage of information-age computer
technology to traditional shorthand reporting, has breathed new life into short-
hand reporting.
32. Electronic verbatim recording technology has been extensively re-
searched over the past thirty years. Even in New York, where the court re-
porter lobby has blocked the permanent and general use of electronic recording
in New York courts, that state's demonstration project has been renewed by the
legislature three times since 1992. In his 1997 report to the state legislature on
the demonstration project, New York's Chief Administrative Judge wrote:
In sum, all indications continue to point to the success of the use of
electronic recording in lieu of court reporters. The equipment has suc-
cessfully been implemented in the courts, significant savings have been
achieved each year, and the judges and other parties in the courtroom
have continued to adapt to the presence of the equipment.
Hon. Jonathan Kippman, Report of the Chief Administrative Judge to the New
York State Legislature, The Governor, and the Chief Judge on the Effect of Elec-
tronic Recording in the State Court System, Jan. 1, 1997, at 32. California's Ju-
dicial Council submitted a favorable report on the state's six-year electronic re-
cording demonstration project which ended in 1992:
The use of electronic recording as an alternative method to produce and
preserve the verbatim court record has been successfully demonstrated
in the current pilot project .... This project confirms what has been
found by the many state and federal courts who have used electronic
recording for years. The issue is one of making a verbatim record, and
electronic recording has proved to be as acceptable in making a record
as that made by a stenographic reporter.
Jud. Council of Cal., Report to the California Legislature on Electronic Record-
ing Demonstration Project, Jan. 1, 1992, at 36-37. In July, 1983, the Federal
Judicial Center issued a 222-page report on the result of the one-year experi-
ment with sound recording in the federal courts that concluded: "Given appro-
priate management and supervision, electronic sound recording can provide an
accurate record of United States district court proceedings at reduced costs,
without delay or interruption, and provide the basis for accurate and timely
transcript delivery." J.M. Greenwood et al., A Comparative Evaluation of
Stenographic and Audiotape Methods for United States District Court Report-
ing, FED. JUD. CTR. at 81 (1983). But see Resource Planning Corporation for the
National Shorthand Reporters Association, An Analysis of the Federal Judicial
Center's Evaluation of Stenographic and Audiotape Methods for United States
District Court Reporting (1983). The Institute for Court Management at the
National Center for State Courts (NCSC) summarized the findings of 20 elec-
tronic court reporting studies (not including the reports on the New York and
California demonstration projects) that were published between 1972 and 1992.
The NCSC's summary reveals that 15 studies favorably evaluated electronic
court reporting compared to five unfavorable studies. "Four of these five reports
were commissioned and paid for by the National Court Reporters Association;
one was prepared on behalf of the State of Hawaii Judiciary." Memorandum
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means in every circumstance. Each verbatim recording tech-
nology has its costs and benefits; no single technology-even
shorthand-is optimal in all courtroom settings.3
Most American courts currently use either audio or video
technology, or a combination of both.34 Verbatim recording
technology continues to evolve, becoming more reliable35 and
versatile." The dire predictions of the court reporting profes-
sion that electronic recording will compromise the integrity of
the record have not materialized.
B. Round I: The Legislative Arena-Private Versus Public
Lobbying
The twenty-seven-year battle in the California legislature
over electronic recording tells a tale of legislative dysfunc-
tion.3 ' The California Court Reporters Association (CCRA) is
one of the most effective lobbying organizations in Sacra-
mento. 8  Since 1987, the CCRA has contributed over
from Rae Lovko & Susan Myers, NCSC, Institute for Court Management, re:
Literature Review of Electronic Court Reporting Methods, and attached Sum-
mary of Literature on Electronic Court Reporting (Mar. 15, 1994, Ref. No.
S94.0083).
33. See Lovko & Myers, supra note 32, at 1 ("In general, these findings re-
veal that while no technology is unquestionably superior in all respects or under
all circumstances, audio recording and video recording are viable court report-
ing methods.").
34. According to a 1993 survey prepared jointly by the Conference of State
Court Administrators and the NCSC, 45 state court systems, the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico courts, and the federal courts either "allow" or "re-
quire" the use of audio tape to record some or all trial proceedings. Video tape
is "allowed" in 17 state jurisdictions, "prohibited" in 7 state jurisdictions, and
"experimental for some or all types of cases" in 10 state jurisdictions and in the
federal courts. David B. Rottman et al., State Court Organization 1993, tbl. 31,
Conference of State Court Administrators and National Center for State Courts
(Jan. 1995, NCJ-148 346).
35. The most recent technological advance is digital court recording which
dispenses with tape, with its attendant playback retrieval problems, and which
records the human voice directly into a computer where it can be processed like
any other computerized data. See John Southherst, Digital Court Recording:
Trial Without Error, 10 CT. TECH. BULL. 1 (1998).
36. Robert Anderson et al., The Impact of Information Technology on Judi-
cial Administration: A Research Agenda for the Future, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1762,
1770 (1993).
37. See infra notes 181-185 and accompanying text.
38. See Dan Walters, A Court Battle over Machines, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec.
10, 1993, at A3. The California Court Reporters Association has become one of
the Capitol's most effective single-purpose lobbying groups, whose lone goal is to
keep tape out of the state's courtrooms. Id.
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$470,000 to candidates for state office. 9
Since 1971, the CCRA has consistently outgunned the
Judicial Council's lobbyists who promote bills authorizing
electronic recording in superior court.4 ' The CCRA prevailed
in every legislative showdown with the Judicial Council over
electronic recording, killing4' or watering down" every bill it
actively opposed. Usually, the CCRA prevented electronic re-
cording bills from reaching the Assembly or Senate floor by
aborting these bills in the Assembly or Senate Judiciary
Committees.
However, the legislature expressly authorized the use of
verbatim electronic recording in California courtrooms in two
limited instances: (1) in municipal court, a court of limited ju-
risdiction;3 and (2) in selected superior courts on a demon-
stration basis for a limited time period (i.e., 1986 to 1994).
1. Electronic Recording in Municipal Court
California Government Code section 72194.5 expressly
authorizes electronic recording in municipal courts whenever
official court reporters are unavailable. The Judicial Council
39. See LEXIS, Legis Library, Cafin File (California State Campaign Fi-
nance Receipts).
40. See Baar, supra note 3, Vol. 2, app., at 664-73 (discussing private and
public lobbying).
41. See Tom Dresslar, The Bill Rejecters-In Sacramento, Court Reporters
Swat Away Endeavors to Change Their Status, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 3, 1993, at 1.
[Tihe CCRA no doubt would rank with the greatest shot blockers in
history. The record shows that when it comes to legislation detrimen-
tal to its members' financial and professional interests, the association
can kill with the best of them .... Assembly Judiciary Committee
Chairman Phil Isenberg puts a slightly different spin on the historical
record. "The Legislature has kowtowed to court reporters in a shame-
less fashion," said the Sacramento Democrat who has lost several duels
to what he calls the "court reporter monopoly."
Id.
42. See infra notes 48-68 and accompanying text.
43. Municipal courts cannot hear civil action in which the amount in con-
troversy exceeds $25,000. See CAL. CIV. PROC. § 85(a). Municipal court crimi-
nal jurisdiction is limited to misdemeanors. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1462
(Deering Supp. 1999). In the 53 out of 58 counties that have voted to unify their
trial courts under Proposition 220, municipal courts no longer exist. On Janu-
ary 2, 1998, the voters approved a ballot measure that "provides for the aboli-
tion of municipal courts within a county, and for the establishment of a unified
superior court for that county, upon a majority vote of superior court judges and
a majority vote of municipal court judges within the county." S.B. 2139, Ch.
931, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998) (Legislative Counsel's Digest).
44. Section 72194.5 provides that:
[Vol. 40
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sponsored this bill to address a critical shortage of court re-
porters in municipal court in the 1970s; neither the text of the
bill nor its legislative history addressed the use of electronic
recording in superior courts.45 The CCRA did not actively op-
pose section 72194.54' because-with the exception of felony
preliminary hearings 47-business is sparse in municipal
court. That is, because few parties appeal municipal court
decisions, most parties do not order transcripts in municipal
court proceedings
2. Electronic Recording in Superior Court:
The Demonstration Projects (1986 to 1994)
In 1986, the legislature also approved the limited use of
electronic recording in selected superior courts by enacting
California Assembly Bill 825--codified as Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 270-that authorized California's first electronic
recording "demonstration" project.48 The act contained a sun-
Whenever an official court reporter or a temporary court reporter is
unavailable to report an action or proceeding in a municipal or justice
court,... the municipal or justice court may order that the action or
proceeding be electronically recorded .... The court shall assign avail-
able reporters first to report preliminary hearings and then to other
proceedings.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 72194.5 (West 1997). To "accommodate the unification of
municipal and superior courts in a county," section 72194.5 was amended in
1998 to permit "a court" to order electronic recording of "court" proceedings in a
limited civil case, or infractions case "where an official reporter is unavailable."
1998 Cal. Stat. 931, § 324 (Law Revision Comm'n Comments, 1998 Amend-
ment).
45. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 72194.5 (West 1997) (Historical and Statutory
Notes) ("The Legislature finds and declares that in many actions and proceed-
ings presently heard in municipal and justice courts, official reporters are either
physically unavailable in a given geographical location or it is not practical from
a cost-benefit standpoint to have official reporters continually available for such
proceedings."). See also JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., Judicial Council Annual Report
for 1989, Chap. 11: Audio & Video Recording Demonstration Projects (1989).
46. See S.B. No. 629, Background Information, Senate Committee on Judi-
ciary (Cal. 1997).
47. As originally enacted in 1975, Government Code section 72194.5 re-
stricted electronic recording to civil actions and misdemeanor criminal pro-
ceedings, excluding felony preliminary hearings. When Government Code sec-
tion 72194.5 was amended in 1989 to expand electronic recording to all actions
and proceedings in municipal or justice courts, the following sentence was in-
serted: "The court shall assign available reporters first to report preliminary
hearings and then to other proceedings." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 72194.5 (West
1975).
48. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 270 (Deering 1991) (authorizing California's
first demonstration project).
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set provision mandating the project's termination by January
1, 1992." In 1989, the legislature enacted California Assem-
bly Bill 1854, which amended Code of Civil Procedure section
270 to extend the life of the demonstration project until
January 1, 1994.0
As originally introduced in the legislature, both Assem-
bly Bill 825 and Assembly Bill 1854 expressly authorized the
blanket and indefinite use of electronic recording in all supe-
rior courts.5 However, in response to vigorous opposition by
the CCRA, each bill was diluted to authorize a limited dura-
tion demonstration project "to assess the costs, benefits, and
acceptability of utilizing audio and video recording as a
means of producing a verbatim record of proceedings in [a
limited number ofi superior court departments."" The dem-
onstration project was not a thoughtful response to a legiti-
mate need for further study of electronic recording in superior
courts. Rather, the demonstration project was the product of
a compromise between the Judicial Council and the CCRA, a
compromise promoted by the Senate Judiciary Committee."
Early versions of Assembly Bill 825 expressly authorized
any California court to use electronic recording to make the
verbatim record "in any case where no party objects." Early
49. 1986 Cal. Stat. 373. ("An act to add Section 270 to the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, and to amend Section 69950 of the Government Code, relating to court
reporters.").
50. 1989 Cal. Stat. 678. ("An act to amend Section 270 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and to amend Section 72194.5 of the Government Code, relating to
courts.").
51. See A.B. No. 825 (Cal. 1985). "SECTION 1. Section 270 is added to the
Code of Civil Procedure, to read: 270. (a) Except in criminal proceedings the
court may authorize electronic court recording or video taping to be used in lieu
of the record prepared by a court reporter." Id. See also A.B. No. 1854 (Cal.
1989). "SECTION 1. Section 69960 is added to the Government Code, to read:
69960. [W]henever necessary to avoid delay in proceedings or to assure prompt
delivery of transcripts, the superior court may order the verbatim record of oral
proceedings in that court to be made electronically." Id.
52. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 270(a) (Deering 1991).
53. See SENATE COMM. ON JUD., Current Proposal Represents a Compro-
mise: Hearing on A.B. 825 Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (1986).
Last year this measure arrived before this Committee in a significantly
different form, establishing a pilot project in Los Angeles County and
providing a blanket authorization for electronic recording devices in ru-
ral counties. Proponents and opponents agreed to undertake negotia-
tions in order to determine if a compromise could be found. After
months of work, they successfully developed the current language and
are now in delicate agreement.
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versions of AB 825 also authorized the presiding judge of the
Los Angeles Superior Court to designate demonstration
courtrooms where "electronic court recording or video taping
devices shall be utilized for normal verbatim record keeping
purposes."54 An amendment to the bill limited the courts
authorized the use of electronic recording in lieu of shorthand
in superior courts "having six or fewer judges" (i.e., superior
courts in rural counties).55
Up to this point in the legislative process, the court re-
porters lobby did not actively oppose the bill because the
CCRA hoped it could persuade the bill's author to limit elec-
tronic recording to a few "demonstration" courtrooms in Los
Angeles County." The situation changed dramatically on
July 11, 1985 when Frank Murphy, CCRA's long-time and ex-
tremely effective lobbyist," notified Senator Bill Lockyer that
his client was "totally oppose[d]" to California Assembly Bill
825."8 Murphy added that "there is no higher priority to the
54. A.B. No. 825 (Cal. 1985) (amended in Assembly May 9, 1985).
55. A.B. No. 825 (Cal. 1985) (amended in Senate July 8, 1985).
56. Frank Murphy, Jr., a lobbyist for CCRA, sent the following letter to
Senator Lockyer in July 1985:
Dear Bill:
As you know I represent the California Court Reporters Association.
CCRA has been cooperating with Assemblyman Harris and the sup-
porters of AB 825 since its introduction in the hope of achieving a con-
sensus on testing the use of tape recorders in certain limited and well-
defined superior court settings in Los Angeles County. CCRA did not,
nor did I, contact any member of the Assembly to oppose any previous
version of the bill. Unfortunately our efforts at accommodation have
been unsuccessful and we must ask your opposition to AB 825. The bill
is scheduled to be heard by the Senate Judiciary committee on July
16th. We feel it makes no sense whatever for the State to require tape
recorders to be made available in superior courts while testing their
use in some Los Angeles County courtrooms.
Among those who join CCRA in opposing AB 825 are the members
of Service Employees International Union.
There is no higher priority to the shorthand reporting profession
than the defeat of AB 825.
Sincerely,
Frank Murphy, Jr. [signed "Frank"]
Letter from Frank Murphy, Jr., to Senator Bill Lockyer (July 11, 1985) (on file
with author).
57. See Dresslar, supra note 41, at 1. "The court reporters usually win, said
Schmidt, because of'the sheer force of Murphy's personality, his persistence and
his constant nagging.' He added, 'Nobody does it better than Murphy. The fu-
ture of technology in the courts will depend on the retirement of Frank Mur-
phy." Dresslar, supra note 41, at 1.
58. Letter from Frank Murphy, Jr., to Senator Bill Lockyer, supra note 56.
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shorthand reporting profession than the defeat of AB 825,"
and that the Service Employees International Union joined
the CCRA in opposition to California Assembly Bill 825."9
Letters opposing the bill suddenly appeared in Senator
Lockyer's office. The Judicial Council and the CCRA negoti-
ated for almost ten months.
The price charged by the CCRA for dropping its opposi-
tion to California Assembly Bill 82560 was steep. As a conse-
quence of the vigorous opposition by the CCRA in the Senate
Judiciary Committee, the version of Assembly Bill 825 finally
enacted was radically different from the early versions of the
bill. The blanket authorization to rural superior courts to use
electronic recording in lieu of shorthand was deleted. A pro-
vision was added protecting the hours of presently employed
court reporters.6 The court reporters believed that the Judi-
cial Council's study would not be objective (since the council
sponsored the bill).62 Thus, the enacted version of Assembly
Bill 825 provided for a dual review of the demonstration proj-
ect: one review by an advisory committee appointed by the
Joint Rules Committee of the Legislature and another by the
Judicial Council. 3 Finally, to sweeten the pot, the CCRA won
a ten-cent-per 100-words increase in the transcription fee
59. Id.
60. A.B. No. 825 (Cal. 1986) (as amended May 22, 1986).
61. "(f) No presently employed permanent court reporter shall have his or
her hours of employment reduced as a result of the demonstration project nor
shall be required to prepare a transcript of a proceeding in a court of the dem-
onstration project." 1986 Cal. Stat. 373.
62. The amended version of the bill stated:
Individuals originally opposed to this measuring [sic] questioned the
objectivity of the Judicial Council in reviewing the use of the electronic
recording, as the Council sponsored the bill in the first place. This dual
review, providing also for minority reports from the advisory commit-
tee, is a compromise meant to ensure that all parties involved have in-
put into the Legislature's evaluation.
A.B. No. 825 (Cal. 1986) (as amended May 22, 1986).
63. The enacted version of the bill stated:
(h) The Joint Rules Committee shall appoint an advisory committee
consisting of two certified shorthand reporters, one person skilled in
courtroom audio recording, one person skilled in courtroom video re-
cording, two judges experienced in trial work, one court administrator,
and two attorneys experienced in trial work to evaluate the demonstra-
tion project, and it shall report its findings and recommendations, in-
cluding minority views, if any, to the Legislature at the same times as
the Judicial Council reports pursuant to subdivision (g).
1986 Cal. Stat. 373.
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that court reporters could charge for original ribbon copy.64
3. The Sunset of the Demonstration Project and the
Demise of the Isenberg Electronic Recording Bill
Anticipating the January 1, 1994 "sunset" of the demon-
stration project, the Judicial Council sponsored California As-
sembly Bill 2937, introduced on February 19, 1992 by Assem-
bly Judiciary Committee Chair Phil Isenberg. This bill would
have given any court the discretion to "utilize audio or video
recording as the means of making a verbatim record of any
hearing or proceedings."65 Notwithstanding the eighteen-year
experience with electronic recording in municipal courts and
six successful years in selected superior courts under the
demonstration project, the bill died in committee on its first
hearing.66 Since the defeat of Assembly Bill 2937, five other
electronic recording bills have been introduced in the legisla-
ture. California Senate Bill 211 died in committee, Assembly
Bill 2113 was defeated on the Assembly floor by forty-one
percent of the total Assembly's membership, and Assembly
Bill 128 died in committee. Assembly Bills 13545 and 1023
are currently pending in committee in the Assembly. 7 The
legislature has never enacted a statute that expressly re-
quires the use of shorthand to make the verbatim record,68
64. See 1986 Cal. Stat. 373 § 2 (amending CAL. GOV'T CODE § 69950).
65. A.B. No. 2937 § 3 (Cal. 1992).
66. See A.B. No. 2937 (Cal. 1992), reprinted in 2 Assembly Final History, at
1968 (1992).
AB2937, carried by Isenberg in the 1991-92 session, would have al-
lowed electronic recording of judicial proceedings. Isenberg was the
only 'yes' vote in his own committee. Not only did Isenberg get ham-
mered, but the Judicial Council got embarrassed. It supported the
measure, but reporters persuaded individual judges to write letters to
committee members opposing it.
Dresslar, supra note 41, at 1.
67. California State Assembly, Bill Information, (visited Oct. 26, 1999)
<http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset2txt.htm>.
68. For a brief time, Assembly Bill 721, sponsored by the CCRA, was pend-
ing in the Senate which would have expressly required the use of official court
reporters who use computer-aided transcription equipment to make the verba-
tim record of all pretrial motions and trial proceedings in superior court civil
cases, and all felony proceedings in justice, municipal, and superior court. The
bill was sponsored in June 1993 by the CCRA as a bargaining chip in its nego-
tiations with the Judicial Council over "long-term use of electronic recording"
after the termination of the demonstration project. Frank Murphy, CCRA lob-
byist, told the press he withdrew the bill "because court officials have rebuffed
the association's invitations to negotiate an agreement on the long-term use of
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
nor has it enacted a statute expressly precluding electronic
recording technology to make the verbatim record.
C. Round II: The Judicial Arena-The Judicial Council, as
Court Administrative Agency, Promulgates Rules of Court
Authorizing Electronic Recording
During the last few years of the second demonstration
project, Los Angeles and Sacramento County superior courts
expanded their use of electronic recording to courtrooms not
officially designated as demonstration courtrooms. 9 It was
the practice and policy in Los Angeles Superior Court to pro-
vide court reporters "on request" in non-demonstration court-
rooms equipped with electronic recording equipment; no court
reporters were provided in demonstration courtrooms. 70 The
court did not require the parties' express consent to electroni-
cally record the proceedings. In expanding electronic record-
ing beyond the limits of the demonstration project, the Los
Angeles and Sacramento superior courts acted on their own
inherent authority,7 without express authority from the Leg-
islature or the Judicial Council.7 ' Through 1993, superior
court judges in Orange and Ventura counties debated ex-
panding the use of electronic recording. 3
electronic recording." Tom Dresslar, Court Reporters Stall Electronic Recording
Bill, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 25, 1993, at 1. See also Philip Carrizosa, Judicial
Council Expands Use of Tape Recorders-Court Reporters Lose Out, L.A DAILY
J., Dec. 1, 1993, at 1 ("[Tlhe court reporters were unsuccessful earlier this year
in pushing through their own bill, which would have required courts to use
court reporters in all felony proceedings and all civil proceedings in superior
courts.").
69. See Jean Guccione, Suing for Security-Reporters Take to the Courts to
Prevent Spread of Electronic Recording, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 3, 1993, at 5.
70. See Lauren Blau, Court Reporters Win a Round in Taping Conflict-
Victory Called Partial, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 3, 1993, at 1.
71. See Guccione, supra note 69.
72. The state Attorney General's office rendered an Informal Opinion to
Frank Zolin, Los Angeles County Clerk and Executive Officer, dated Jan. 4,
1989, that "the Los Angeles County Superior court may lawfully expand the use
of electronic recording in lieu of a court reporter in more than the five depart-
ments authorized for the demonstration project authorized by Section 270(a)(1)
of the Code of Civil Procedure subject to a number of limitations." The opinion
stated that electronic recording could not be used in lieu of an official reporter
where an official reporter was available and where a party has requested an of-
ficial reporter.
73. See Nancy Morse, The Reporter Never Rests-Videotaping Program Ex-
pands; Not Everyone Happy, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 18, 1993 §2 at 1 ("Results from
the first two years of a pilot program to replace court reporters with a video-
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On February 2, 1993, the Los Angeles County Court Re-
porters Association (LACCRA) petitioned the Los Angeles
Superior Court for a writ of mandate which "challenged the
court's practice of using electronic recording devices rather
than certified court reporters to make a record of general civil
proceedings where neither the assigned judge nor the parties
requested that an official shorthand reporter record the pro-
ceedings."" The LACCRA sought to enjoin the superior court
from electronically recording proceedings in Los Angeles
County courtrooms that were not officially part of the demon-
stration project. The superior court had a two-pronged re-
sponse. First, the court asserted that the practice was not in-
consistent with Code of Civil Procedure section 269(a), which
requires an official court reporter to make a verbatim record
of proceedings only "at the request of either party, or of the
court in a civil case . . . ."" Second, the court claimed it had
the "inherent power to utilize electronic recording when nec-
essary for the orderly and efficient operation of the Los An-
geles County superior courts," citing the "inadequate number
of court reporters" and the "cost-effectiveness and efficiency of
electronic recording" as policy justifications.76
The case was transferred to Kern County Superior Court
judge Robert Anspach who, on August 6, 1993, "split the
baby" by prohibiting the Los Angeles superior courts from
utilizing electronic recording of proceedings in excess of the
number of courtrooms authorized by Code of Civil Procedure
section 270 "except where the parties and the court do not re-
quest a court reporter and the parties agree with the approval
of the court to the use of electronic reporting."7   Observing
that Code of Civil Procedure section 269(a) "does not provide
for the use of electronic recording in lieu of a court reporter,"
taping system have been so positive [Orange County] Superior Court officials
say they will expand its use from three courtrooms to six."); see also Dresslar,
supra note 41.
74. Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 341, 342-43 (Ct. App. 1995) [hereinafter LACCRA]. Court reporters
also brought suit against the Sacramento Superior Court to confine electronic
recording of proceedings to demonstration courtrooms. "Sacramento Superior
Court Judge James T. Ford 'agreed with the court reporters' argument last Sep-
tember, ordering his own court to stop using electronic recording in at least six
civil law departments." Guccione, supra note 69.
75. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 269(a) (West Supp. 1999).
76. LACCRA, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 343 (emphasis added).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
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Judge Anspach held that, without express legislative author-
ity, "only an official reporter can transcribe superior court
proceedings."78 The judge also wrote that "nothing in the
statutes... suggest[s] that the required use of a court re-
porter cannot be waived and the parties stipulate to the use of
electronic recording.
79
Both parties appealed. LACCRA wanted a ruling pro-
hibiting electronic recording under any circumstances, as-
serting that "a variety of related statutes demand the conclu-
sion that 'the Legislature has indicated its intent that only
shorthand court reporters ... be used in superior court court-
rooms unless otherwise expressly authorized by the Legisla-
ture."'80 The Los Angeles Superior Court objected to the
judge's extra requirement of an express stipulation by the
parties in order to use electronic recording.
On November 30, 1993, one month before the sun set on
the demonstration project, the Judicial Council promulgated
the rules of court8 (the "Electronic Recording Rules"),
authorizing superior court judges to use electronic recording
to make the record of court proceedings. In substance, the
Electronic Recording Rules expressly "authorized," but did
not require, superior courts to use audio or video recording in
either of two circumstances: (1) where an official reporter is
"unavailable,"82 or (2) where the parties proceed in the ab-
sence of an official reporter "without objection." Where a
court reporter is unavailable, parties remained free to hire a
"shorthand reporter to serve as an official pro tempore re-
porter."
8 3
Thirteen months after the Judicial Council adopted the
Electronic Recording Rules, and nine months before the Cali-
fornia First District Court of Appeal invalidated them in
CCRA I, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed Judge
Anspach's ruling in the LACCRA case. The court found that
the Los Angeles Superior Court was
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 344.
81. News Release #46, Administrative Office of the Courts, Dec. 2, 1993.
82. Rule 980.3 liberally defines "unavailability" to include "when the court
determines that the funds available for reporting services are insufficient to
employ a qualified person for the position at the prevailing wage or at the nor-
mal per diem rate of compensation." CAL. CT. R. 980.3(b)(2) (repealed 1997).
83. CAL. CT. R. 891.
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not prohibited, by any explicit or implicit legislative com-
mand contained in ... [the same statutes relied upon by
the CCRA I court] .... from choosing to maintain a record
of general civil proceedings by means of electronic record-
ing devices where neither the court nor any party requests
that a verbatim record be taken by an official shorthand
reporter pursuant to the provisions of section 269.84
D. Round III: The Judicial Arena-The Superior Court
"Adjudicates" the Constitutional Validity of the Electronic
Recording Rules
Immediately after the Judicial Council promulgated the
Electronic Recording Rules, the CCRA petitioned the
Alameda County Superior Court to enjoin the Judicial Coun-
cil and Alameda County court officials from implementing the
Electronic Recording Rules in CCRA L"
The CCRA conceded that "no legislative act is expressly
inconsistent with the challenged rules."86 Rather, the court
reporters argued that the challenged rules exceeded the scope
of the Judicial Council's rule-making power under the Cali-
fornia Constitution, Article VI, Section 6 ("article VI, section
6").87 Article VI section 6 of the California Constitution em-
powers the Judicial Council to "adopt rules for court admini-
stration, practice and procedure, not inconsistent with stat-
ute .... ." The court reporters claimed that "the elaborate,
integrated, extensive system created by legislative acts for
certified shorthand reporting creat[ed] inconsistency with the
Electronic Recording Rules."88
The superior court first addressed the standard for de-
termining whether a rule of court was "inconsistent" with
statute under article VI, section 6." The superior court
84. Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 341, 349-50 (Ct. App. 1995). The LACCRA court was careful to under-
score that its holding was "very narrow .... We go no farther than this circum-
scribed conclusion; in particular, we do not decide the purposes, if any, for
which the generated electronic recording may be used, because this question is
outside the scope of the discrete issue presented by the association's petition
and evidence." Id.
85. California Court Reporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 44, 47 n.9 (Ct. App. 1995), affd, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997).
86. Id. at 51.
87. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §6.
88. Statement of Intended Decision at 11, CCRA I, supra note 1.
89. "To improve the administration of justice the council shall ... adopt
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adopted a narrow definition of "not inconsistent," which gave
a broad scope to the Judicial Council's rule-making power by
facilitating the reconciliation of rule with statute and,
thereby, avoiding a conflict.9"
Under the superior court's liberal interpretation of the
Judicial Council's rule-making power, article VI, section 6
empowers the Council to promulgate "parallel"91 rules that
supplement, but do not undercut, the statute. The exercise of
the council's rule-making power is not restricted to ground
covered by the legislature, as is the case with legislatively
delegated power of administrative agencies created by regula-
tory statutes.92 In effect, the council, as the state judicial sys-
tem's constitutionally constituted rule-making agent, is inde-
pendently empowered to "pick up the trail" where the
legislature leaves off (or, for political reasons, "fears to
tread"). Thus, the superior court's interpretation rejects the
notion of an implied field preemption by the legislature of the
council's rule-making power.
The superior court's narrow interpretation of "not incon-
sistent with statute" provided the lens through which it pro-
ceeded to interpret the statutes relied upon by the court re-
porters as evidence of an implied statutory scheme to
preclude electronic recording from superior courts. The
court's analysis did not begin with Code of Civil Procedure
section 269(a), which mandates the duties of the official court
reporter. 3 Rather, the court relied on Government Code sec-
rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not inconsistent with
statute .... " CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
90. Statement of Intended Decision at 19, CCRA 1, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44.
"Not inconsistent" does not mean merely inharmonious or unsymmetrical
but connotes impossibility of concurrent operative effect, or contradictory in
the sense that the provisions cannot co-exist; . . . "Inconsistent" means mu-
tually repugnant or contradictory; contrary, the one to the other, so that
both cannot stand. The acceptance or establishment of the one implies the
abrogation or abandonment of the other.
Id.
91. Id at 22. "In Ferguson v. Keays, 4 Cal. 3d, 649 (1971), the Supreme
Court held the Judicial Council was authorized to promulgate rules even if
those rules created a [sic] alternative scheme, parallel to the existing legislative
scheme." Id.
92. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
435 (1993). An administrative agency is a creature of statute and may not act
"ultra vires, that is, beyond its statutory authority .... Agencies are to imple-
ment these statutes and neither amend nor ignore them." Id.
93. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 269(a) (West Supp. 1998) (providing that the
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tion 69941 which permits-but does not require-the superior
court judge to appoint an official reporter. The court con-
cluded:
[Code of Civil Procedure] section 269 sets forth the duties
of a superior court official reporter. The duties set forth
are to be performed by the official reporter upon the re-
quest of a party or court in a civil action or upon order of
the court, attorney for the defendant, or district attorney
in a criminal action or proceeding. Particularly in light of
Government Code Section 69941, Section 269 cannot be
read to mandate the appointment of an official reporter,
nor does it govern the making of the official record of oral
proceedings before the court where a court reporter is not
available.94
In the last paragraph of his opinion, the judge finally ac-
knowledged the court administration policy justification for
the council's Electronic Recording Rules. Emphasizing that
the rules give courts and litigants the option to use or not use
electronic recording, the judge concluded, "the ER authorizes
electronic reporting only in the limited court and party choice
determination, where it is necessary for the convenient opera-
tion of the superior courts and upon unavailability of official
reporters.""
E. Round IV: CCRA I-The Court of Appeal Strikes Down the
Electronic Recording Rules as "Inconsistent with Statute"
In October, 1995,96 the First District Court of Appeal re-
versed the superior court's decision. Its opinion is divided
into three parts.
In Part A, the CCRA I court rejects the superior court's
interpretation of "not inconsistent with statute."9'7 Based on
its review of California cases invalidating rules of court, the
CCRA I court synthesizes a standard for measuring the va-
official reporter "shall, at the request of either party . . . take down in short-
hand" the proceedings in superior court).
94. Statement of Intended Decision at 23, CCRA I, supra note 1, (emphasis
added).
95. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
96. At the time the CCRA I decision was filed, 71 courtrooms in the Los An-
geles Superior Court used electronic recording. See Lawmaker Proposes Bill to
Allow Electronic Recording of Trials, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 1, 1996, at 11.
97. California Court Reporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 44, 49 (Ct. App. 1995), affd, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997).
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lidity of rules of court against statutes. Under this standard,
the interpreting court must not endeavor to reconcile the text
of the rule with the text of the statute. Rather, the court
must bypass the express statutory text-apparently whether
the text is ambiguous or not-to find the legislative intent
behind the text and then determine whether the rule of court
is consistent with that legislative intent.98
In Part B, the court applies its "legislative intent" stan-
dard to the statutes addressing official court reporters or elec-
tronic recording.99 The court arranges these statutes like
pieces of a jigsaw puzzle to reveal a "legislative pattern [that]
suggests that while electronic recording is sometimes proper,
the normal practice is that a shorthand reporter is to create
the official record unless statutory law provides otherwise. 1 °°
The court found a "statutory scheme [that] addressed the
making of the official record in such a manner as to suggest
that the legislature implicitly intended that this record be
made by shorthand reporters rather than by electronic re-
cording."1 °1
Part C of the court's opinion addresses the legislature's
failure to enact bills that expressly authorize electronic re-
cording in superior court as further evidence of a legislative
98. Id. at 50.
[California courts that have invalidated rules of court as inconsistent
with a statute] did not test the validity of the rule of court by deter-
mining whether it was impossible as a matter of law for both the stat-
ute and the rule to have concurrent operative effect, as the trial court
did in our case. Instead, the courts measured the challenged rule
against the statutory scheme to determine whether the rule was con-
sistent with the intent expressed in the legislative enactment.
Id.
99. The court reviewed the following statutes in the following order: CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 269(a) (which, according to the court, "sets out the basic pro-
visions for requesting an official reporter"); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 270 (the
demonstration project); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 273 (which makes the official
reporter's certified transcript prima facie evidence of the proceedings); CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 68086 (which prescribes the fees and costs of an official reporter);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 69941 (which authorizes superior court judges to appoint an
official reporter); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 69952 (which prohibits the court from "or-
der[ing] to be transcribed and paid for out of the county treasury any matter or
material except that reported by the [official] reporter"); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 69948, 70044.5-70064 (which regulate the compensation to be paid to official
reporters); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 72194.5 (which expressly authorizes electronic
verbatim recording in municipal court when official reporter is unavailable).
100. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54.
101. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
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intent to preclude such electronic recording. The court ac-
knowledges that "unadopted proposals have been held to have
little value [as evidence of legislative intent]"' and disavows
basing its opinion on failure to enact electronic recording
bills.0 3 Nonetheless, it "cannot ignore the fact that the legis-
lature's rejection of the Judicial Council's proposed amend-
ments is in accord with our interpretation of the existing
statutory scheme."0 4 However, the court refused to consider
the history of legislative dysfunction behind each of the failed
electronic recording bills and so again failed to keep its
promise to look "behind the text." The unenacted bills relied
upon by the court were usually aborted by lobbying efforts of
the court reporters in committee. CCRA I ratified this dys-
function by choosing to preempt for the legislature-and
therefore, the court reporters-the judiciary's power to man-
age the record of proceedings in superior court.
F. Round V: CCRA II-The Court of Appeal Revisited; Final
Victory for the Court Reporters and Electronic Recording in
Superior Court Goes Down for the Count
The court of appeal's decision did not end the litigation
between the courts and the court reporters over electronic re-
cording. The CCRA I decision merely remanded the case back
to the superior court for judgment in conformity with the
CCRA I decision. A major dispute erupted over the scope of
the appellate court's holding in CCRA L"'
102. Id. at 55.
103. Id. at 56 ("In light of the difficulties of determining the meaning of leg-
islative rejection of proposed amendments to existing statute, we think it wiser
to arrive at our conclusion independent of the Legislature's rejection of the pro-
posed amendments.").
104. Id.
105. This dispute flowed from the continued use by a substantial number of
superior courts of their electronic recording equipment to make the verbatim
record. See Declaration of Gary M. Carmer in Support of Motion for Entry of
Judgment at 1, CCRA I, supra note 1. Los Angeles County Superior Court, for
example, continued to follow its practice, upheld in the LACCRA decision, of
using electronic recording equipment in its courtrooms but providing official re-
porters upon request. In response to inquiries from superior courts about the
"circumstances under which electronic recording may still be used by the
courts," the Administrative Office of the Courts advised superior court judges
that the LACCRA decision permitted superior courts to "use electronic recording
in the absence of a request from a party or the judge." "Thus, in the absence of
a request for a court reporter from a party or the court, electronic recording may
be used." Memorandum from Administrative Office of the Courts to All Pre-
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The Judicial Council advocated a narrow interpretation
of CCRA I that only invalidated the Judicial Council's Elec-
tronic Rules of Court and Alameda County Superior Court's
local rule 17 but left untouched the electronic recording prac-
tices of superior courts apart from the invalidated rules of
court. The CCRA contended that CCRA I holds any use of
electronic recording to make the official record in superior
court to be "inconsistent with statute," "regardless of whether
an individual litigant objects."106 The broad holding urged by
the CCRA would put the First Appellate District's CCRA I
decision on a collision course with the Fifth Appellate Dis-
trict's holding in LACCRA, 17 rendered nine months earlier.
The Fifth District held that superior courts "are not prohib-
ited from choosing to maintain records of general civil pro-
ceedings by means of electronic recording devices where nei-
ther the court nor any party requests that a verbatim record
be taken by an official shorthand reporter pursuant to the
provisions of Code of Civ. Proc. § 269. ""1°
On remand, the superior court sided with the court re-
porters. The superior court held that the appellate court's
remittitur implicitly imposed a duty on the superior court to
enter judgment invalidating the challenged rules and enjoin-
ing the respondents (the Judicial Council and Alameda
County Superior Court officials) from expending public funds
for the maintenance or creation of nonstenographic methods
of making official verbatim records of superior court pro-
ceedings. °9 In other words, the superior court imposed a total
ban on electronic recording, even where the parties do not re-
quest an official reporter.
On appeal from this second superior court decision, the
First District Court of Appeal construed the scope of its
CCRA I holding."' The "CCRA IT' court chose a broad hold-
ing and sustained the superior court's sweeping judgment in-
siding and Sole Judges of the Trial Courts (on file with author).
106. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Entry of
Judgment at 6, CCRA I, supra note 1.
107. Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 341 (Ct. App. 1995).
108. Id. at 342-43.
109. Order Denying Petitioners' Motion to Amend CCRA I, supra note 1.
110. California Court Reporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 69 Cal. Rptr.
2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997), affg 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44 (Ct. App. 1995) [hereinafter
CCRA II].
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validating the challenged rules. The CCRA II court "declared
that the use of nonstenographic methods for producing the
OFFICIAL verbatim record of superior court proceedings
[are] contrary to the intent of the Legislature,"' and enjoined
both the Judicial Council and the Alameda County Superior
Court from "authorizing and from causing the expenditure of
public funds for the maintenance of or creation of a nonste-
nographic method and system for preparing the official verba-
tim record of superior court proceedings.""2 CCRA II creates
a fundamental conflict between the First and Fifth District
Courts of Appeal that needs to be resolved by the California
Supreme Court.
After the CCRA II decision, a few California superior
courts continued to utilize electronic recording devices. The
will of the Los Angeles County Superior Court outlasted all
direct attempts, in the legislature and the courts, to shut
down their electronic recording machines. Los Angeles
County avoided CCRA ITs proscription on the use of state
funds by directly financing electronic recording with county
funds."' Ironically, however, a trial-court-funding reform bill,
enacted in 1997 and sponsored by the Judicial Council to
promote efficient financial management of the courts,"
sounded the death knell of electronic recording in Los Angeles
County Superior Court as of January, 1998.1' Under Assem-
111. Id. at 530 (citing Judgment, CCRA I, supra note 1) (uppercase text in
original).
112. Id. at 531.
113. See Robert Green, Supervisors Approve Contracts for Electronic Record-
ing in Superior Court, METROPOLITAN NEWS CO., July 31, 1996 at 5; see also
Rebecca Liss, Court Workers Face Layoffs by New Year's-Electronic Taping of
Trials Silenced by State Funding Bill, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 21, 1997, at 1.
114. See A.B. No 233 (Cal. 1997) Commentary: "The Legislature makes find-
ings and declarations for use in interpreting the bill, including: The judiciary is
a separate and independent branch of government. State funding of trial court
operations is necessary to provide uniform standards and procedures, economies
of scale, and structural efficiency and simplification." Section 3(l) declares the
Legislature's intent to "acknowledge the need for strong and independent local
court financial management," giving "strong preference to the need for local
flexibility in the management of court financial affairs." (emphasis added). Id.
115. Responding to the CCRA II decision, the Los Angeles Superior Court
terminated the use of electronic recording on January 1, 1998. See Telephone
Interview with Juanita Blankenship, Administrator, Litigation Support Serv-
ices, Los Angeles Superior Court (Jan. 6, 1999). Los Angeles Superior Court
Judge Kurt Leriour still defends the ban on electronic recording in his court-
room. See Margaret Jacobs, Stenographers Fraud; Bid to Keep Newer Technolo-
gies Out of Court, L.A. DAILY J., May 3, 1999, at 4. See also Maraget Jacobs,
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bly Bill 233, counties no longer give money directly to the
courts but to the state which disburses funds through the
Trial Court Budget Commission. Further, thirteen court-
rooms in Orange County Superior Court still employ elec-
tronic recording to make the record."' In Orange County,
court-generated fees fund video recording of court proceed-
ings."7 In a 1998 unpublished opinion that characterized
CCRA I as a dubious decision, the Fourth Appellate District
court upheld the use of electronic recording in Orange County
Superior Court, relying on the LACCRA decision." 8
III. EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN COURT
ADMINISTRATION: JUDICIAL SELF-GOVERNANCE IS
THE KEY TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, EFFICIENCY, &
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
One of the most significant developments in the civil jus-
tice system in the United States during the twentieth century
has been the dramatic evolution of court administration from
dependence on the legislative and executive branches, to the
development of a professionally staffed "state court adminis-
trative office""9 functioning within the judicial branch. °
Courts are ultimately still dependent on the legislative
branch for funding, court reorganization, and other adminis-
trative matters. 2' Nevertheless, the development, at mid-
century, of professional administrative agencies within state
Stenographers Fight for Their Day Jobs in Court, WALL ST. J., April 30, 1999, at
B1.
116. Letter from Pat Hill, Executive Director, Civil Operations and Special
Services, Orange County Superior Court, to Glenn Koppel (Aug. 13, 1999) (on
file with author). The practice in these courtrooms is to videotape proceedings
where no party objects. Id. While particular practices vary, superior courts in
Lassen, Amador, Kings, and San Bernardino counties still employ electronic re-
cording under certain circumstances. See Richard Helius & John Palmer, Tele-
phone Survey of California Superior Courts.
117. Telephone Interview with Pat Hill, Executive Director, Central Justice
Center and Special Services, Orange County Superior Court.
118. Gandall v. Grimes, No. 710153 (Super. Ct. Cal. Orange County 1998).
119. WHEELER, supra note 10, at 30.
120. Id. at 3. ("What is new to the twentieth century-emerging only at mid-
century, in fact-is the presence in this continually contentious process of a
separate judicial branch administrative capability.").
121. Judges heavily lobby the legislature. See Baar, supra note 3, at 626
("When final authority rests with Congress by virtue of the distribution of pow-
ers, members of the judiciary will have to lobby Congress so that Congress and
the judiciary can take concerted action.").
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and federal judicial systems has strengthened the courts' con-
trol over their own operations. Further, judicial control over
court administration is a key to judicial independence. 122
Besides judicial independence, judicial control of court
administration implicates other fundamental public values:
efficiency and public accountability. '23 Efficient administra-
tion of justice was a major theme of progressive reformers
who, at the turn of the century, laid the groundwork for mod-
ern judicial administrative reform.124 The Judicial Council
movement, which spawned California's Judicial Council, ad-
vocated a "business administration of justice led by a minister
of justice... the business manager of our judiciary."125 The
emergence during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s of state court
administrative offices was a watershed in judicial branch
court administration. The tasks entrusted to judicial admin-
istrators expanded beyond mere "housekeeping" chores. Ju-
dicial administrators achieve efficiencies by "infusing the
courts' operations with basic administrative skills, such as es-
tablishing and maintaining management systems for court
records, personnel and finances" and "oversee the develop-
ment of management of automated management information
systems, techniques to improve jury usage, and systems to
122. See WHEELER, supra note 10, at 3-4 ("[T]he importance of judicial inde-
pendence permeates judicial administration."). See also FISH, supra note 20, at
437.
Administrative institutions and politics are, after all, but means to an
end; they are generally not ends in themselves. They give life to the
separation of powers doctrine in that the judge-developed administra-
tive system enables courts to adjust to changes in their legal, political,
and economic environment without surrendering judicial independ-
ence. Through them, courts may obtain sufficient resources to exercise
final legal authority. Administrative institutions thus foster the judici-
ary's long run capacity to function as a coordinate part of the national
political system.
FISH, supra note 20, at 437.
123. WHEELER, supra note 10, at 4 ("For in the final analysis, the protection
of judicial independence and of the just, expeditious, and economical case dispo-
sition for which judicial independence is instrumental is the higher value that
defines judicial administration and legitimates its claim for respect.").
124. WHEELER, supra note 10, at 13 ("[The concept of efficiency] loomed
prominently in the vocabulary of the early twentieth-century Progressive re-
formers, when judicial administration as a discrete activity was first taking
hold.").
125. Id. at 28 (quoting Davidson, A Business Administration of Justice, 11 J.
AM. JUD. Soc'y 40, 48-49 (1927)).
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manage courts' budgets."26
Judicial self-governance furthers judicial accountabil-
ity. 7 The judicial system needs the administrative authority
to meet its constitutional obligation to provide efficient and
effective justice to the public.'
An essential tool in the hands of judicial administrators
to enforce these public values is an effective rule-making
power over practice, procedure, and, most importantly, court
administration. 9 Whether by constitutional amendment or
statutory delegation, the initiative for making rules of civil
procedure in most jurisdictions has passed from the legisla-
tive to the judicial branch. In these jurisdictions, judicially
promulgated rules supersede pre-existing statute.3 0  How-
ever, in California the legislature is still the dominant rule-
making authority.' Article VI, section 6 confers only a sec-
126. Id. at 28.
127. See Hudzik, supra note 8, at 1881 ("It clearly is the judiciary's responsi-
bility to define and implement an adequate system of adjudication for the state
and its citizens. Further, as a public servant, it is the judiciary's responsibility
to maximize the efficient and effective use of public resources.").
128. See WHEELER, supra note 10, at 37 ("By promoting judicial accountabil-
ity in the proper sense, court administrative offices not only meet a function vi-
tal to republican government, but also fend off improper threats to independ-
ence.").
129. Id. at 37 ("Judicial control of rule making... protects the judiciary's
ability to determine how it will operate.").
130. In these jurisdictions, the legislature possesses a reserve power to over-
ride rules of court through subsequently-enacted legislation. The Federal Rules
Enabling Act is an example of such a rule-making regime. See infra text ac-
companying notes 155-156.
131. New York State's legislature, like California's, also has a powerful rule-
making role in court administration. In 1977, the people adopted a constitu-
tional amendment that bifurcated the rule-making authority between the leg-
islature and the Chief Judge. Article VI, section 30 gives the legislature exclu-
sive authority to regulate jurisdiction, practice and procedure, while article VI,
section 28 confers on the Chief Judge plenary authority over all matters of court
administration which she can delegate to the chief administrator of the courts.
See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 28, 30. The jurisdictional line between court ad-
ministration, on the one hand, and practice and procedure, on the other, is
blurred. See Bloom v. Crosson, 590 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div. 1992), af/'d 82
N.Y.2d 768 (1992). New York's court reporters challenged the validity of a rule
of court authorizing the use of electronic recording as part of a demonstration
project. At issue was whether
regulation of the manner and method of recording judicial proceedings is a
regulation of practice and procedure such that the Chief Administrator's
authority to exercise that power is subject to the constraints of the New
York Constitution, article VI, section 30 or is an administrative function,
inasmuch as the subject necessarily involves personnel issues and issues
relative to the form of court records ....
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ondary rule-making power on the council to promulgate rules
that are "not inconsistent with statute."'32 In the event of a
conflict between a statute and a rule, the statute trumps the
rule.
In the last thirty years, the judicial rule-making power
nationally has been channeled more specifically toward court
administration.'33 Reflecting and reinforcing the fundamental
transformation of court administration in the 1960s through
1980s, the judiciary's rule-making power in many jurisdic-
tions was expanded by constitutional amendment to explicitly
add "court administration" to "practice and procedure."34
California was one of those jurisdictions.'
Paralleling the swift evolution of the judiciary's role in
court administration in the last hundred years, technology
has rapidly evolved from the industrial era of the late nine-
teenth century to the contemporary information age. Tech-
nology is quickly permeating all levels of court administra-
tion. 136 The key to efficient use of scarce judicial resources is
the effective utilization of information technology, which judi-
cial administrators increasingly deploy to meet the budget
Id. at 328.
132. The California Supreme Court confirmed the legislature's primary rule-
making authority in In re Lance W.:
The Legislature and, a fortiori, the people acting through either the re-
served power of statutory initiative or the power to initiate and adopt
constitutional amendments (art. II, § 8) may prescribe rules of proce-
dure and of evidence to be followed in the courts of this state.... That
the authority of the judicial branch of government is subject to legisla-
tive enactment of rules of procedure is implicit in article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution which empowers the Judicial Council to
"adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not in-
consistent with statute."
In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985). But for the determined opposition of a
single legislator, the proposition submitted to the people in 1926 would have
amended article VI, section 6 to confer full rule-making power on the council.
See infra Part V.A.2.a.ii.
133. See Charles W. Grau, Judicial Rulemaking: Administration, Access and
Accountability: A Research Project of the American Judicature Society, CHICAGO
AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 1 (1978).
134. See infra note 243.
135. In 1966, the people adopted an amendment to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution adding "court administration" to "practice and proce-
dure" as the subjects of the Judicial Council's rule-making power.
136. Technology has transformed the way the verbatim record of court pro-
ceedings is kept. See infra Part IV. See also Anderson, supra note 36, at 1785
("The growing trend toward audio recording of proceedings will give way to
widespread use of video recording, yielding a far more comprehensive record.").
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crises that are challenging the courts in the 1990s.'37 The
marriage of technology and court administration is inevitable.
The judicial system has been "conceptualized as an informa-
tion processing system."
Individual courts need managerial flexibility to use tech-
nology to effectively manage their resources."' Court admin-
istrators struggle to find a productive balance between cen-
tralized and de-centralized court administration.
Coordination of activities within the judiciary militates to-
ward centralization while decentralization gives local court
administrators flexibility to spend funds and utilize techno-
logical resources to suit local needs."9 The Judicial Council's
Electronic Recording Rules were an attempt to strike a bal-
ance between centralized and de-centralized court admini-
stration in the use of electronic recording in superior court.
The accelerated pace of technological change in court
administration threatens vested interests that raise political
obstacles to the "integrat[ion] of technology into a coherent,
effectively managed system."'' 0 For example, court reporters
adamantly and-in California-successfully opposed the use
of electronic recording technology as an alternative means of
making the verbatim record.''
The growth of active and increasingly powerful judicial
branch administrative bureaucracies has "created another
source of power within the courts"'42 that provoked a backlash
both within the judiciary, among judges who fear the loss of
their individual independence,' and outside the judiciary,
among legislators suspicious of mounting judicial assertive-
ness.14
137. See, e.g., Hudzik, supra note 8, at 1840 ("Under all except the 'probable
best case scenario,' the next decade's likely funding levels will put increasing
pressure on the management of judicial system resources.").
138. Id. at 1889.
139. On the continuing efforts within the federal judiciary to achieve a bal-
ance between centralized authority and local autonomy, see JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE COURTS: As APPROVED
BY THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, 75 (1995).
140. See Hudzik, supra note 8, at 1790.
141. Id. at 1794 ("To the extent that courts substitute video tape recording
for stenography in courtrooms we may anticipate a reduction in the use of court
reporters.").
142. WHEELER, supra note 10, at 34.
143. See id. at 34.
144. See James Duke Cameron et al., The Chief Justice and the Court Admin-
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The heightened level of extra-judicial lobbying in legisla-
tures has stimulated a rising tide of skepticism.'45 Legislators
perceive that recent judicial activism in statutory reform and
rule-making as "born of self-interest."'46 Compounding the
court administrators' problem, special interest lobbyists
added procedural statutes to their shopping list,'47 seeking to
shape procedure and court administration to serve their
vested interests. Responding to special interest lobbying,
Congress increasingly intervenes in federal rule making,'
eroding the deference traditionally accorded the rules prom-
ulgated by the U.S. Judicial Conference.149 Judicial lobbyists
are generally at a disadvantage when going toe-to-toe with
private lobbyists in the legislature.'
Within the judiciary, tensions exist between centralized
istrator: The Evolving Relationship, 113 F.R.D. 442, 444 n.4 (1987) ("It should
be noted that the opposition by the legislative and executive branch to court re-
form is not illogical .... It is not surprising ... that there exists opposition to
reforms that might increase the power of the judiciary.").
145. See, e.g., Chief Justice Ronald M. George, State of the Judiciary Address
to the California Legislature (Feb. 23, 1998).
146. Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the
Judiciary's Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1996).
147. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crum-
bling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 659, 669. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without
Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74
VA. L. REV. 275, 285 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Politics Without Romance].
148. See Koppel, supra note 12, at 471-87.
149. Professor Stempel writes that Congress's deference to the judiciary in
rule-making matters
[lasted only] so long as Congress (or the relevant congresspersons in-
fluential in judicial policy) are not besieged by interest group pressures
at odds with the judiciary's objective, and so long as Congress respects
the judiciary enough to defer to it and the Enabling Act process. For
the most part, it appears that this set of circumstances prevailed dur-
ing the 1934-1974 period, enabling civil rules revision to be revised
largely by the bench.
Stempel, supra note 147,at 712.
150. See Geyh, supra note 146, at 1216-17.
[Special interest] lobbyists routinely confront accusations that their po-
sitions are animated by self, not public interest, but judges and the Ju-
dicial Conference are not ordinary legislative lobbyists. For example,
private sector lobbyists routinely campaign for, make contributions to,
and attend functions for congressional candidates. One need not be a
hardened cynic to appreciate the value of such undertakings to the lob-
bying enterprise. The Judicial Conference, in contrast, may not exploit
these means of influence.
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court administration and traditionally autonomous judges 5'
and their personnel.' Early efforts by the U.S. Justice De-
partment to assert administrative control of the "far-flung"
federal district courts in the late nineteenth century evoked
"anguished cries of protest" from judges, their staff, and their
allies in Congress. 5 ' The mere fact that centralized adminis-
trative judicial authority moved in-house has not abated
these tensions. 
54
IV. THE COURT'S ROLE IN INTERPRETING STATUTES THAT
DEFINE THE COURTS' ROLE IN COURT ADMINISTRATION:
A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
A. Judicial Interpretation and the Traditional Role of
Legislative Intent in Determining Conflict Between Rule and
Statute
In most jurisdictions, the judicial and the legislative
branches exercise concurrent authority over rules of practice,
procedure, and court administration.55 In the majority of
these jurisdictions, the judiciary has the rule-making initia-
tive, with the legislature reserving the power to override judi-
cially-promulgated procedure. Federal courts, for example,
follow this rule-making regime under the Rules Enabling Act
of 1934.151 In California, however, the balance of power is
151. See Cameron et al., supra note 144, at 455.
152. See WHEELER, supra note 10, at 19.
When judicial administration emerged as a recognizable phenomenon,
judges and existing administrative personnel embraced the idea with
much less enthusiasm, to say the least, than their predecessors had
shown to the concept of judicial independence. The hostility, which has
not disappeared entirely, reflects a fear that administration will snuff
out independence.
Id.
153. See FISH, supra note 20, at 95.
154. See infra Part V.A.2.b. Tensions between judges and centralized court
administration provide a possible explanation for the hostile tone taken by the
First District Court of Appeal in California Court Reporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Judi-
cial Council, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997), affg 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44 (Ct.
App. 1995).
155. See A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over
Judicial Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 7 (1958).
156. In the last 20 years, Congress has increasingly intervened directly in the
rule-making process as interest groups have awakened to the benefits of lobby-
ing court procedure.
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tilted in the direction of legislative dominance. Although the
legislative and judicial branches concurrently exercise rule-
making power, in the event of a conflict between statute and
rule, statute trumps rule.'57 In a minority of jurisdictions, as-
sertive courts claim-through case law-exclusive rule-
making power that precludes the legislature from enacting
procedural law.'58
Where courts and legislatures concurrently exercise rule-
making power, courts determine questions of conflict between
a rule and a statute by exercising their traditional adjudica-
tive function of interpreting constitutional and statutory text.
The traditional, originalist, approach to statutory interpreta-
tion casts the court in the passive role of "honest agent" of the
enacting legislature. As honest agents, courts purport to
"mechanically retriev[e]'1 9 legislative intent (or, in the case of
ballot measures, popular intent) from statutes and constitu-
tional provisions. When courts seek to determine issues of
conflict between rule and statute, the rhetoric of legislative or
popular intent can camouflage the constitutional values cho-
sen and enforced by the interpreting court.
60
B. Abandoning the Search for Legislative Intent in Favor of a
Dynamic Interpretation of Text that Affects Court
Administration
A revolution in thinking about statutory interpretation in
the last decade toppled the traditional primacy of legislative
157. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
158. See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan & Warren J. Greene, The Legislature's Rela-
tion to Judicial Rule-making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV.
L. REV. 234 (1951). See also Richard S. Kay, The Rule-making Authority and
Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV. 1, 34 (1975) (The "Con-
necticut doctrine" of exclusive judicial rule-making completely withdraws "the
legislature from any role at all in formulating procedure, either as initiator or
supervisor."); John M. Mulcahey, Comment, Separation of Powers in Pennsylva-
nia: The Judiciary's Prevention of Legislative Encroachment, 32 DUQ. L. REV.
539, 552 ("The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has employed the separation of
powers doctrine to declare acts by the legislature unconstitutional even if the
acts do not conflict with any judicial order.").
159. Jane Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy
in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 599 (1995) [hereinafter
Schacter, Metademocracy].
160. I propose that the CCRA I court masked its policy choices regarding the
balance of power in court administration behind the rhetoric of legislative in-
tent. See infra Part V.A.2-3.
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intent among interpretation theorists.61
The traditional concept of the court's role in statutory in-
terpretation is rooted in the nineteenth century populist view
of legislative supremacy in which the legislature is the only
democratically legitimate source of policy. Under this "origi-
nalist" or "intentionalist"1" view, judges cannot appear to cre-
ate policy, but merely troll statutes for legislative intent.
However undemocratic the political realities in the legislature
that produced the statute under review, the court must ignore
any legislative dysfunction that may favor special interests
over the public interest. In the words of one contemporary
writer, "[0]nce a statute is enacted and comes to the court for
interpretation, the democratic pedigree of the legislative pro-
cess that produced the statute goes unchallenged and unscru-
tinized, absent some constitutional infirmity."'63
Legal process scholars' in the late 1940s and 1950s re-
framed the interpretive task of the court from searching for
original intent to constructing the enacting legislature's pur-
pose behind statutory text.' This "legal process" approach
relied on the fiction that legislatures were "filled with reason-
able people acting reasonably [who] tend to pass public-
161. See Jane Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilem-
mas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 110 (1995) ("The viability of such
'intentionalism' has long been discredited by scholars and is sharply under-
mined by widespread contemporary skepticism about objective theories of
meaning and about the pluralist political process from which statutes emerge.")
[hereinafter Schacter, Pursuit of Popular Intent].
162. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479-80 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory In-
terpretation].
[The] 'intentionalist' approach asks how the legislature originally in-
tended the interpretive question to be answered, or would have in-
tended the question to be answered had it thought about the issue
when it passed the statute. A 'modified intentionalist' approach uses
the original purpose of the statute as a surrogate for original intent,
especially when the latter is uncertain; the proper interpretation is the
one that best furthers the purpose the legislature had in mind when it
enacted the statute.
Id.
163. Schacter, Metademocracy, supra note 159, at 597.
164. Henry M. HART, JR., & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tentative ed. 1958), from
which the appellation "legal process" derives.
165. Schacter, Pursuit of Popular Intent, supra note 161, at 601 n.33 ("This
focus on purpose represents a judicial attempt to honor what the court con-
cludes the legislative intent would have been had the legislature expressly con-
templated and resolved the question at hand.").
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seeking laws, so long as the legislators follow the deliberate
procedures required by the [C]onstitution.' 166
"Post-legal process" theorists, drawing upon public choice
literature,"' question the "optimistic pluralist" assumption '
that the interplay of interest groups in the legislature pro-
duces public-seeking statutes."9 Professor Schacter observes
a "rising cynicism about the 'realities' of the legislative proc-
ess."170  Much of this cynicism flows from "public choice"
scholarship, which "assumes that people [including legisla-
tors] are egoistic, rational utility maximizers in political as
well as economic arenas." 7' Rather than reflect rational pub-
lic policy, a statute "tends to represent compromise because
the process of accommodating conflicts of group interest is
one of deliberation and consent ... . What may be called
public policy is the equilibrium reached in [the political]
struggle at any given moment.' 72
Statutory interpretation scholarship experienced a ren-
aissance over the last ten years, spawning a variety of new
approaches to statutory interpretation.' Dynamic interpre-
tation is one of these new theories. Dynamic interpretation of
statutory and constitutional text is not "an objective and me-
chanical process of 'discovering' historical meaning" but,
rather, "the 'creation' of meaning from the interaction of the
166. Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 147, at 276.
167. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of
Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 878 (1987) (describing public choice theory).
168. Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 147, at 276 ("'Optimistic
pluralists' posit that the legislature, filled with reasonable people acting rea-
sonably, will tend to pass public-seeking laws, so long as the legislators follow
the deliberative procedures required by the Constitution.").
169. See id. at 277 ("Public choice theory indicates that the legislature will
produce too few laws that serve truly public ends, and too many laws that serve
private ends."). See also Schacter, Metademocracy, supra note 159, at 598 n.14
("Although the debate now rages about the virtues of the pluralist conception,
scholars with widely divergent ideological views nevertheless analyze American
democracy in terms of interest group activity.").
170. See Schacter, Metademocracy, supra note 159, at 605.
171. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory and Constitu-
tional Interpretation: Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal
process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 703 (1987) (quoting DENNIS C. MUELLER,
PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (1979)).
172. Id. (quoting Earl LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS 35-36 (1952)).
173. See Schacter, Pursuit of Popular Intent, supra note 161, at 606 n.59
("Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and di-
verse.").
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text, historical context, and evolutive context."'74 Dynamic in-
terpretation is based on the proposition "that statutory inter-
pretation is influenced by the ongoing, not just original, his-
tory of the statute."'75 Professor Eskridge observes that
judges inevitably exercise discretion when they interpret old
statutes that the legislature has not updated:
As society changes, adapts to the statute, and generates
new variations of the problem which gave rise to the stat-
ute, the unanticipated gaps and ambiguities prolifer-
ate .... Moreover, as time passes, the legal and constitu-
tional context of the statute may change. Should not an
interpreter "ask [her]self not only what the legislation
means abstractly, or even on the basis of legislative his-
tory, but also what it ought to mean in terms of the needs
and goals of our present day society[?]" 116
Dynamic interpretation theory rejects the traditional role
of the judge as "honest agent" of the legislature who mechani-
cally discovers the enacting legislature's intent. Rather, the
interpreting judge functions as the enacting legislature's
partner in the ongoing, evolving process of creating meaning
from statute. 7 Drawing upon "hermeneutics," 17 Eskridge
conceives of the interpretation process as "a dialogue between
the statutory text and the judge."'79
Drawing upon public choice scholarship, dynamic inter-
pretation theory also focuses on legislative dysfunction-the
power of single-purpose interest groups to enact their own
private interests at the expense of the public interest-as the
reason why legislatures are reluctant to update obsolete stat-
utes and prone to enact rent-seeking legislation.8 ° Eskridge
writes:
Both public choice theory and institutional process the-
ory suggest that the legislature acting alone will be sub-
ject to three biases which undermine the overall legiti-
macy of government: failure to enact or update public
174. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 162, at 1498.
175. Id. at 1497.
176. Id. at 1480 (citation omitted).
177. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO.
L.J. 319, 330-31 (1989) [hereinafter Eskridge, Spinning Legislative Supremacy].
178. Id. at 346 ("Hermeneutics considers interpretation to be a dialogue or
conversation between the present interpreter and the historic text.").
179. Id. at 347.
180. See Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 147, at 296.
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interest laws, avoidance of hard choices, and favoritism
directed at power groups. These biases may be amelio-
rated by treating judges as representatives charged with
interpreting statutes dynamically.""
A creative judiciary should adopt "a more aggressive ap-
proach to statutory interpretation [that] can ameliorate these
dysfunctions."182 Courts can perform a meta-democratic func-
tion of interpreting statutes to compensate for the misfiring of
the democratic process in the legislature. Eskridge proposes
that "[c]ourts can counteract the effect of legislative inatten-
tion to general public interests by interpreting statutes dy-
namically as the statutes grow older"'83 and also serve to "de-
velop[1 our nation's public values."1"
I propose that statutes and constitutional text that
regulate court administration lend themselves to dynamic in-
terpretation.85 Court administration implicates basic public
values such as judicial independence, judicial efficiency, and
judicial accountability to the public for the administration of
justice. Court administration has evolved dramatically over
the course of the twentieth century; formerly autonomous
courts have coalesced into coherent, statewide judicial enter-
prises and have developed in-house administrative mecha-
nisms to manage judicial business.8 ' The public value of ju-
dicial independence has taken on new meaning in the second
half of the twentieth century as the establishment of offices of
court administration wean courts away from their traditional
dependence on the legislative and executive branches of gov-
ernment."' Similarly, technology has rocketed from the in-
dustrial age into the information age, transforming the way
businesses, including the courts, manage their operations.
Court administration statutes enacted at the turn of the cen-
tury or earlier need to be updated to reflect these dramatic
changes in public values and technology.
181. See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 162, at
1530.
182. Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 147, at 314-15.
183. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 162, at 1531.
184. See Eskridge, Spinning Legislative Supremacy, supra note 177, at 321.
185. See discussion infra Part V.A.3.b.
186. See Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 147, at 276.
187. WHEELER, supra note 10, at 11 ("Most courts had an exclusive relation-
ship with their corresponding legislative and executive bodies, usually munici-
pal government.").
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A dynamic interpretation of the verbatim reporting stat-
utes would acknowledge the legislative dysfunction that al-
lows a single-purpose interest group, with a vested interest in
its own shorthand technology, to throttle virtually all efforts
to update the acts. The key code sections that derive from the
original 1861 statute currently read substantially as they did
in 1861.188 A dynamic interpretation of these statutes con-
fines them to their original public-regarding purpose, thereby
allowing the Judicial Council to update the rules to accom-
modate electronic recording technology.
Where legislative dysfunction prevents the updating of
statutes that implicate core court administration concerns, I
propose that courts resolve ambiguities in statutory text in
favor of permitting the judicial rule-making arm to perform
the updating function. My proposal is a variation on Esk-
ridge's approach in that the updating function would not be
performed by the court in its traditional adjudicatory role but
in its extra-judicial administrative role.
V. AN ILLUSTRATION OF How COURTS COULD DYNAMICALLY
INTERPRET STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT THAT
REGULATES COURT ADMINISTRATION: A CRITIQUE OF THE
CCRA I OPINION
189
A. Critique of Part A of CCRA I-The Court's Interpretation
of the Meaning of "Not Inconsistent with Statute" Stacks the
Deck in Favor of Finding Conflict Between Rule of Court and
Statute
In Part A of the CCRA I opinion, the court purports to in-
terpret the meaning of "not inconsistent with statute" to de-
velop an interpretive principle-a lens-through which it
construes selected statutes in Part B and selected unenacted
bills in Part C. This lens is flawed for three reasons. First, as
a matter of separation of powers policy, this lens distorts the
roles of the Judicial Council and, therefore, the California
188. See supra text accompanying notes 18-26.
189. My focus is on the challenged rules of court of the Judicial Council and
whether or not they are "inconsistent" with statute. I, therefore, do not con-
sider, as a separate question, whether individual superior courts, exercising
their inherent powers, could purchase and operate electronic recording devices
to make a record of proceedings in the absence of a Judicial Council rule of
court.
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courts in court administration, making the Council's role ap-
pear smaller than it is. Second, as a tool for statutory inter-
pretation, this lens is grounded in the fiction of implied legis-
lative intent that bypasses statutory text and reflects the
court's own view of the proper balance of power between the
courts and the legislature, rather than the view of the legisla-
ture, or of the constitution. Third, the lens developed in Part
A of CCRA I itself is the product of distorted constitutional
interpretation of article VI, section 6 that masks the court's
own separation of powers policy choices behind the fiction of
popular intent and stare decisis.
The court interprets the ambiguous phrase "not inconsis-
tent with statute," in article VI, section 6, to require the court
to "measure[] the challenged rule against the statutory
scheme to determine whether the rule was consistent with
the intent expressed in the legislative enactment."9 ° Based
on this interpretation, the court sets for itself, in Part B, the
following task of statutory interpretation: "We must deter-
mine whether the statutory scheme addresses the making of
the official record in such a manner as to suggest that the
Legislature implicitly intended that this record be made by
certified shorthand reporters rather than by electronic re-
cording."'
1. What the CCRA I Court Purported to Do, But Didn't
In interpreting "not inconsistent with statute," the court
purports to follow the command of the people, as articulated
in article VI, section 6, and of the California Supreme Court
through its case law invalidating the rules of court. The
phrase "not inconsistent with statute" is ambiguous. Its
meaning does not spring inexorably from text and high court
precedent but, rather, from the court's own policy choice to
view the Judicial Council as a legislatively created adminis-
trative agency rather than a constitutionally constituted
agency of the state judicial system. The court's policy choice
is rooted in California's nineteenth-century populist tradition
and does not accurately reflect the contemporary role of the
Judicial Council in court administration. Similarly, the
190. California Court Reporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 44, 50 (Ct. App. 1995), affd, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997).
191. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
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court's legislative-intent-based interpretive approach is simi-
larly rooted in an anachronistic concept of the court's role in
statutory interpretation.
The court's interpretation of "not inconsistent with stat-
ute" follows a two-step analysis.
a. Step 1: Measure the Rule of Court for Consistency
With Statute
The court first transforms the phrase "not consistent"
into "consistent" by concluding that "the challenged rules
must be measured for consistency against the legislative en-
actments."19 In determining the relative value assigned to
the council's rules and the legislature's statutes, the court
steers its analysis to the question of the relative power of the
Judicial Council versus the legislature as institutions of gov-
ernment. The court rejects as "specious" its perception of the
council's argument "that as it and the Legislature both derive
their powers from the state constitution, the two institutions
are coequals."9 ' In fact, the Judicial Council's brief made the
following argument: "The legislature and the Judicial Council
(as the representative of the judiciary) are thus coequal
branches of government, each deriving authority from the
Constitution of the State of California."9 ' By omitting the
192. See id. at 49.
193. Id.
194. Respondent's Brief at 5, CCRA I, supra note 1. Unfortunately, this ar-
gument placed the emphasis on the Judicial Council rather than on the judici-
ary, placing the council's role as the judiciary's agent in parentheses and em-
phasizing the council's constitutional rule-making authority rather than the
judiciary's co-equal status as a constitutionally-constituted branch of govern-
ment invoking the concept of judicial independence from the other two
branches. In support of its Petition for Rehearing, pursued by new counsel, the
Judicial Council made the "coequal" argument more persuasively:
[Tihe Judicial Council is the rule-making body of the judiciary, a sepa-
rate branch of government in the tri-partite system established by the
California Constitution .... The Judicial Council has authority
granted by the Constitution-not by the Legislature-to enact any
rules it deems appropriate for better court administration, practice and
procedure, so long as its rules are 'not inconsistent with statute.'...
Under the tripartite system of government established by the Califor-
nia Constitution, the Judicial Council does not exist to carry out the
will of the Legislature, and does not depend on the Legislature for its
authority. The fact that the Legislature has-for whatever political,
parliamentary, or arbitrary reasons-not enacted a statute embodying
a particular rule of procedure is no bar under the California Constitu-
tion to the adoption of such a rule by the Judicial Council.
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critical words in parentheses, the court distorted the council's
fundamental separation of powers argument. Relying upon
oft-cited language in Lane v. Superior Court,9' adopted by the
California Supreme Court in Stockton Theaters, Inc. v. Pal-
ermo,"' that the council's rule-making power is limited by the
legislature's higher rule-making authority, the CCRA I court
concluded that the Legislature, as an institution of govern-
ment, was an inherently higher authority than the Judicial
Council. "[The Judicial Council's] rule-making power is lim-
ited by existing law as enacted by the Legislature, thus
making the legislative branch an inherently higher authority
than the Judicial Council itself.""9 7
Viewing the Judicial Council as institutionally subordi-
nate to the legislature, the court concludes that "[tihe chal-
lenged rules must be measured for consistency against the
legislative enactments."'98 This standard effectively relegates
the status, or "value," of the council's rules of court to that of
administrative agency regulations which, "[tIo be valid,...
must be within the scope of authority conferred by the ena-
bling statute."'99 CCRA I makes this analogy between Judi-
cial Council rules of court and administrative regulations ex-
plicit by stating that, "[a]s with Judicial Council rules,
administrative regulations are only valid if they are consis-
tent with statute."2 9°
The court's logic is flawed in concluding that because a
statute trumps a conflicting rule, the Judicial Council is a for-
tiori hierarchically subordinate to the Legislature in court
administration, rather than a parallel rule-making institu-
tion. In fact, Lane v. Superior Court does not support the
court's inference that the legislature is hierarchically superior
to the Judicial Council.2 0' Lane stands for nothing more than
Petitioner for Rehearing of Respondent Judicial Council of California at 13-14,
CCRA I, supra note 1.
195. Lane v. Superior Court, 285 P. 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930).
196. Stockton Theaters, Inc. v. Palermo, 304 P.2d 7, 11 (Cal. 1956) (quoting
Lane at 862).
197. California Court Reporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 44, 49 (Ct. App. 1995), affd, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis
added).
198. Id.
199. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Dep't of Developmental Servs., 696
P.2d 150, 153 (Cal. 1985).
200. CCRA 1, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56.
201. The rule-making power of the Judicial Council would seem to be limited
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a statute trumps a rule but only where the rule conflicts with
202the statute.
The court conflates two separate issues. The first issue is
whether a statute overrides a conflicting rule. The answer is
clearly yes, under article VI, section 6 of the California Con-
stitution. However, this answer does not address the second
question of whether rule, in fact, conflicts with statute. °3 Ar-
ticle VI-which defines the Judicial Power-endows the Judi-
cial Council with its own rule-making power that parallels
that of the legislature. It is, therefore, inapposite to measure
the validity of a rule of court, especially in the area of court
administration, by an administrative agency standard of
"consistency against legislative enactments." '' °4
The CCRA I court also relies on Shay v. Roth211 in defin-
ing "consistent" as "in agreement" or "harmonious" and re-
jecting the trial court's definition as "more than merely in-
harmonious, but ... connoting an impossibility of concurrent
operative effect." ' 6  Shay v. Roth is completely inapposite.
The issue in Shay was whether certain terms of a county
charter were "consistent" with the California Constitution."°7
Article 7.5 of the California Constitution expressly requires
county charters to be "consistent with and subject to" the con-
stitution.2 8 By contrast, article VI, section 6 deliberately em-
ploys the word "not inconsistent," rather than "consistent."2 9
Consistency implies a subordinate hierarchical relationship
by any existing law. The constitution reserves to the legislature and the people
the primary and higher right to provide rules of procedure for our courts, with
the secondary right in the Judicial Council, to adopt rules only, when and where
the higher authority of the legislature and the people has not been exercised.
202. Stockton Theaters, Inc. v. Palermo 304 P.2d 7, 11 (Cal. 1956) (citing the
quoted language in Lane v. Superior Court, 285 P. 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930),to
support the proposition that the legislature has the power to "enact, subse-
quently, a statute which would have the effect of amending the existing rule").
203. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (Background Comments to 1966 Amendment,
California Constitutional Revision Commission) ("But it should be remembered
that while the Judicial Council is empowered only to formulate rules 'not incon-
sistent with law(s),' it is the courts which determine whether or not such a con-
flict exists.").
204. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49.
205. Shay v. Roth, 221 P. 967, 969 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923).
206. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49 (referring to the trial court's interpreta-
tion of the phrase "not inconsistent with statute").
207. Shay, 221 P. at 967.
208. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
209. CAL. CONST. art. 7.5.
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that agency regulations bear to a statute and county charters
bear to the state constitution. Furthermore, article VI, sec-
tion 6 requires the rule to be measured against a statute, not
against clearly superior constitutional text. The CCRA I
court implicitly viewed the Judicial Council rules of court as
bearing the same subordinate relationship to the statute as a
county charter bears to the California Constitution.21 °
b. Step 2: In Measuring a Rule's Consistency with
Statute, Bypass Statutory Text and Go
Directly to the Implied Legislative Intent
Behind the Statutory Scheme
Having determined that "the challenged rules must be
measured for consistency against legislative enactments," the
court defines "legislative enactments" to mean implied legis-
lative intent behind a statutory scheme.21" ' The court's im-
plied intent standard is not articulated in any of the cases
cited in CCRA I. As a policy matter, this standard represents
an abdication by the decision-making arm of the judiciary of
the constitutionally granted rule-making power of the judici-
ary's administrative arm. This new yardstick of rule validity
invites appellate courts to "imply" legislative preemption of
vast tracts of court administration territory.
Again, the CCRA I court does not take responsibility for
its recalibration of power over court administration. Instead,
the court's standard for determining whether a rule is incon-
sistent with statute purports to be the product of the court's
synthesis of "the pertinent California cases." A close analysis
210. Shay, 221 P. at 968. In Shay, the court adopts an ordinary-meaning-of-
the-text rule of construction for constitutional text ratified by the people: "[iut is
the general rule that in construing the provisions of the constitution the words
employed therein shall be given the meaning which they bear in ordinary use."
Id.
211. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49. The court goes on to state:
Having reviewed the pertinent California cases [which invalidated
rules of court], we conclude that when evaluating whether a rule of
court is 'not inconsistent with statute' within the meaning of the Cali-
fornia Constitution, a court must determine the Legislature's intent
behind the statutory scheme that the rule was intended to implement
and measure the rule's consistency with that intent .... We must de-
termine whether the statutory scheme addresses the making of the offi-
cial record in such a manner as to suggest that the Legislature implic-
itly intended that this record be made by certified shorthand reporters
rather than by electronic recording.
Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
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of these cases reveals that stare decisis does not dictate the
court's formulation, which is a new standard of rule validity
that undermines the secondary rule-making power of the Ju-
dicial Council.
The court's interpretive standard assumes that every
statute is part of a thoughtfully and deliberately designed
"statutory scheme." Only one of the five cases relied upon by
the court refers to a "statutory scheme." In People v. Hall,212
the California Supreme Court invalidated a Judicial Council
rule of court that cut back the discretion granted to the sen-
tencing court under the Uniform Determinate Sentencing
Act, which the high court described as an "elaborate sen-
tencing scheme."213 Unlike the "statutory scheme" stitched
together by the CCRA I court from a congeries of statutes en-
acted by different legislatures at disparate historical periods
in response to divergent challenges to court administration,
the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act was a single statute
designed to overhaul the sentencing laws to provide a uniform
sentencing scheme.
The CCRA I court's search for an implicit legislative in-
tent suggested by the statutory scheme is also not supported
by the cited cases. Courts have traditionally sought refuge in
the rhetoric of legislative intent to avoid the undemocratic
appearance of usurping the lawmaking function from the
212. People v. Hall, 883 P.2d 974, 975 (1994).
213. In re Robin, 579 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1978) (concerning the only other case cited
by the court that arguably involves a statutory scheme, though not denominated
as such by the California Supreme Court). "California's statutes dealing with
the detention of minors during the pendency of juvenile court proceedings
[which] are largely a product of the Legislature's overhaul of the Juvenile Court
Law in 1961." Id. at 3. "In enacting the 1961 revisions, the Legislature sub-
stantially followed the recommendations and proposals of [the commission]."
Id. None of the other cited cases required the court to discern the implicit leg-
islative intent behind a "statutory scheme." See Cortez v. Bootsma, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 20, 22 (Ct. App. 1994) (local court rule that placed a cap on the amount
superior court can award in reasonable attorney's fees held to be inconsistent
with statute that vests the superior court with unrestricted discretion to award
reasonable attorney's fees); see also Sadler v. Turner, 230 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564
(Ct. App. 1986) (rule of court requiring a "motion to dismiss for failure to amend
following the sustaining of a demurrer [to be] made [on written notice]" held to
be inconsistent with statute that had been interpreted by prior case not to re-
quire "notice" but merely an ex parte motion); Iverson v. Superior Court, 213
Cal. Rptr. 399, 401-02 (Ct. App. 1985) (rule of court requiring all papers oppos-
ing a motion to be served "at least five court days" before the hearing date held
to be inconsistent with statute requiring service "at least five days" before the
hearing).
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people's representatives in the legislature. The new wave of
statutory interpretation scholarship has debunked legislative
intent as the lodestar of statutory construction.214 Only three
of the cited cases use the rhetoric of legislative intent under-
lying the statute, and none of these three cases ventures into
the fictional realm of "implied" intent.215 One of the three
cases, instead, resorts to the "ordinary meaning of the statu-
tory words themselves" as the best evidence of legislative in-
tent. 16
Further, in each of the five cited cases, it is readily ap-
parent that the challenged rule of court undercut the scope of
the statute. In none of the decisions did the court inflate
statutory scope, as did the CCRA I court, by arranging a col-
lection of disparate statutory pieces, enacted over a 130-year
period, to construct an implied scheme. The text of the perti-
nent "court reporter" statutes gave the trial judge discretion
to appoint official court reporters but unlike the cited cases,
the Judicial Council's Electronic Recording Rules did not un-
dercut that discretion. Instead, the rules supplemented that
discretion with express authorization to employ electronic re-
cording as an alternative verbatim recording technology when
an official reporter was unavailable or the parties consented.
CCRA !s fabrication of an implied statutory scheme that
authorizes only official shorthand reporting to the exclusion
of electronic technologies goes far beyond Hall.
Finally, CCRA I does not distinguish between rules of
practice and procedure and rules of court administration.
214. See supra Part IV.B.
215. See Hall, 883 P.2d at 982 (holding rule of court that "limits trial court's
discretion to consider the full range of aggravating factors that traditionally
have been relied upon under the [Determinate Sentencing Act]" to conflict with
the governing statutes where court determines the "Legislature's intent that ag-
gravating circumstances, relating to the defendant's background and status,
constitute proper matters for consideration by a court in sentencing under the
DSA." (emphasis added)); see also In re Robin, 579 P.2d at 3 ("Clearly, the Legis-
lature intended that a minor be released from detention if a jurisdiction hearing
is not held within 15 days of the detention hearing."). The Robin court drew
upon legislative history to determine the "Legislature's purpose to strictly limit[]
preadjudication detention" and found that the rule of court that allowed the dis-
trict attorney "to avoid the release of the minor after 15 judicial days by using
the technique of dismissing the original petition, filing a new petition based on
the same transaction, and, after a detention hearing on this second petition, de-
taining the minor for a new period of 15 judicial days" frustrated the "Legisla-
ture's purpose" and, therefore, conflicted with statute.
216. Iverson, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 401-02.
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The Judicial Council rules of court administration, as distinct
from practice and procedure, are entitled to special deference
under the 1966 amendment to article VI, section 6. Although
the council's Electronic Recording Rules intimately implicate
court administration policy,"7 the cited cases deal with rules
of practice and procedure that govern the course of the civil or
criminal action," 8 not court administration."'
2. What the CCRA I Court Was Really Doing: The Court
Imported Its Own, Outdated, Perspective of the
Judicial Council as Servant of the Legislature
In California, where a rule of court conflicts with a stat-
ute, the statute wins. 220 Article VI, section 6 of California's
constitution mandates this dominance of a statute over a con-
flicting rule. In essence, article VI, section 6 provides a vague
yardstick for measuring a rule's validity: rules that are "in-
consistent" with statute are invalid.
However, the text of article VI, section 6 does not provide
a means for determining the existence of a conflict between a
rule and a statute. A conflict between a rule and a statute
can be found-or avoided-depending on how the court inter-
prets the scope of the applicable statute(s). The CCRA I court
compounds the dominance of a statute over a conflicting rule
by inventing an interpretive principle for determining the
existence of a conflict between a rule and a statute that
217. See infra Part V.B.3.a.
218. See In re Robin, 579 P.2d at 1 ("An order... dismissing the petition [in
juvenile court] prior to the jurisdiction hearing shall not in itself bar the filing of
a subsequent petition commencing new proceedings based upon the same alle-
gations as in the original petition."). See also Cortez v. Bootsma, 33 Cal. Rptr.
2d 20 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding that in contested actions, no attorneys fees can be
awarded exceeding the amount agreed by the plaintiff to be paid to the plain-
tiffs attorney); Hall, 883 P.2d at 974 ("When a [criminal] defendant is subject to
an enhancement for which three possible terms are specified by [the Uniform
Determinate Sentencing Act], '[t]he upper term may be imposed for an en-
hancement only when there are circumstances in aggravation that related di-
rectly to the fact giving rise to the enhancement."'); Sadler v. Turner, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 561 (Ct. App. 1986) (requiring motion to dismiss for failure to amend fol-
lowing sustaining of a demurrer shall be made on written notice); Iverson, 213
Cal. Rptr. at 399 (1985) (opposition papers must be filed five court days before
hearing).
219. But see Walker v. Superior Court, 807 P.2d 418, 424 (Cal. 1991) (inter-
preting statute narrowly in deference to the superior court's "assessment of its
administrative and supervisory needs," to avoid the "inefficient consequences
that would flow from petitioners' narrow reading of the statute").
220. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (amended 1966).
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stacks the deck in favor of finding a conflict.
The interpretive principle set forth in Part A of CCRA I
invites the interpreting court to construct a statutory scheme
that "suggests" an "implicit" legislative intent to preempt the
Judicial Council's rule-making power-even where the literal
text of the statute and the rule can be reconciled. The
CCRA I court's reliance on an implied, unexpressed, legisla-
tive intent to determine the existence of conflict compounds
the fiction of "legislative intent." The CCRA I opinion en-
courages courts to construe court administration statutes
broadly, thereby placing more rules of court on a collision
course with those statutes. The resulting increase in judicial
determinations of rule invalidity will weight the balance of
power in court administration more heavily in favor of the
legislature.
The CCRA I court engaged in a kind of reverse dynamic
interpretation of article VI, section 6 that belies its "honest
agent" rhetoric. The court's interpretation of "not inconsis-
tent with statute," to mean consistent with an implied legisla-
tive intent constructed by the interpreting court, is not dic-
tated by the language of the section, legislative or ballot
history, or precedent. 21
Contrary to the CCRA I court's subservient view of the
power of the Judicial Council, court administration in Cali-
fornia evolved from judicial dependence on the legislative and
executive branches to self-governance.
a. The Evolution of Court Administration in
California from Popular Control to Self-
Governance
i. Phase I: The Code Tradition and Popular Control
of the Courts (1846-1926):
CCRA /s view of the Judicial Council as institutionally
subordinate to the legislature reflects a culture of popular
control of the courts that is deeply engrained in the political
subconscious of California. California was imprinted at birth,
in 1850, with the nineteenth-century "code" tradition of leg-
221. See discussion infra Part V.A.2.a.ii (The search for the legislative or
popular intent behind the phrase "not inconsistent with statute" is chimerical.
Judicial reform does not spark widespread interest among the bar let alone the
public.).
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islative dominance over the courts in rule making."22 Sparsely
settled frontier states like California, which achieved state-
hood after the adoption of the Field Code by New York's leg-
islature in 1848, were receptive to a ready-to-wear, legisla-
tively enacted code of civil procedure.223 As a former Mexican
territory, California also inherited the civil law tradition of
legislatively enacted codified law.224 Therefore, unlike the
eastern states, California has no collective memory of a time
when the courts exercised complete rule-making power.225
Furthermore, the nineteenth century witnessed a wave of
popular participation in court administration that departed
from the federal courts' model of appointed, life-tenured
judges aloof from politics. In fact, "[tihe constitution of every
state that entered the union after 1846 provided for a popu-
larly elected judiciary."2 California's frontier society pro-
222. See Koppel, supra note 12, at 461, 464-67; see also LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 394 (2d ed. 1985) ("The ink was
hardly dry on Field's Code when Missouri adopted it into law (1849). In 1851,
California, a new state, at the uttermost limit of the country, enacted the Field
Code.").
223. FRIEDMAN, supra note 222, at 406. See also Koppel, supra note 12, at
461. While most states have abandoned the code tradition, emulating the fed-
eral model of judicial rule-making embodied in the Rules Enabling Act of 1938,
legislative dominance in procedural rule-making has remained entrenched in
California. Id. But see Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rule-
making, 75 JUDICATURE 161 (1991). What began in New York as a reform
movement to use legislative codification to simplify and rationalize court proce-
dure turned into a procedural nightmare as successive legislatures, in response
to interest group pressure, added layer upon layer of patchwork amendments.
Legislatures sought to regulate every detail of court activity. Id. at 163. See
also Bloom v. Crosson, 590 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div. 1992), affd, 624 N.E. 2d 175
(N.Y. 1993). Even New York state, the home of the Field Code, has, by constitu-
tional amendment in 1977, transferred to the Chief Judge "plenary authority
over matters of court administration," while reserving to the Legislature "exclu-
sive authority to regulate jurisdiction, practice and procedure." Id. However,
the Legislature continues to exercise considerable power over court administra-
tion as evidenced by the fact that the Chief Judge continues to seek legislative
authorization for electronic recording, much the way California's Judicial Coun-
cil did until it promulgated its own Electronic Recording Rules in December
1993. Id.
224. 1 Cal. 588, 604 app. (1850). After debating the merits of the common
law versus the civil law systems, the first California legislature rejected the
civil law system. Id.
225. See Koppel, supra note 12, at 464-65.
226. WHEELER, supra note 10, at 17. See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 222, at
371.
After the middle of the century, the popular election of judges was more
and more accepted as normal. Every state that entered the union after
1846 provided that the voters would elect some or all of their judges.
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vided particularly fertile soil for these populist seeds2 7 blow-
ing from the East. The CCRA I court's emphasis on "legisla-
tive intent" as the end game of statutory interpretation is also
historically rooted in the populist culture of the nineteenth
century where "judges stressed that they did not make law."
Thus, the populist movement solidified the concept of judicial
dependence on the legislature. The CCRA I court adopted
this populist-based concept.
ii. Phase II: The Judicial Council Era (1920s and
1930s) and Article VI, Section 6-Self-Governance in
Judicial Administration
Review of the legislative and ballot history behind article
VI, section 6 reveals a complete absence of any contempora-
neous consideration of the meaning of the phrase "not incon-
sistent with statute." There are no clear commands to the
courts, emanating from the 1926 legislature or the people who
adopted the ballot initiative, to guide the courts' interpreta-
tion of this ambiguous phrase.
However, the bar sponsors of the 1926 amendment in-
tended to create a Judicial Council that moved the admini-
stration of justice in California away from the populist model
of legislative dominance and toward a progressive, self-
governing model that transcends direct political influence.
This progressive movement supports an interpretation of "not
inconsistent with statute" that promotes a vigorous Judicial
Council to manage court business.
The creation of the California Judicial Council in 1926
was the progeny of the national "progressive" judicial reform
movement of the early twentieth century that espoused pro-
fessionalism over politics2s in court administration.2 2 1 With
The California Constitution of 1849 made the whole system elective,
from the supreme court down to justices of the peace.
Id.
227. For the effect of populism on court administration, see Cameron et al.,
The Chief Justice and the Court Administrator: The Evolving Relationship, 112
F.R.D. at 439. They attribute the rise of court administrators not only to in-
creasing caseloads but to a "decline in the effect of populism, to the point that
even legislators and even governors were willing to help the courts in becoming
more efficient." Id. at 446.
228. See WHEELER, supra note 10, at 29 ("Progressives of the early part of
this century saw their mission to promote the public interest against what a
1915 publicist called 'special and minority interests and corrupt special influ-
ence.-).
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the support of the organized bar, twenty-six states created
Judicial Councils during the 1920s and 1930s. ° The ap-
proval of the Judicial Council Amendment on the November,
1926 ballot was followed a year later by the enactment of the
California state bar bill.
The bar sponsors of the Judicial Council Amendment
emphasized that the amendment was a "promising begin-
ning" toward "placing the sole responsibility for the admini-
stration of justice upon the judicial branch, giving it adequate
power to prescribe the methods whereby the judicial machin-
ery shall operate.... "' Consistent with the progressive
movement's principles "to promote the public interest against
what a 1915 publicist called 'special and minority interests
and corrupt special influence,' 232 the state bar promoted the
Judicial Council Amendment as a first step toward a self-
governing judiciary that would administer the courts on busi-
233
ness principles rather than in response to special interests.
Unlike most judicial councils, which merely "advised"
legislatures, California's Judicial Council was constitution-
ally endowed with limited rule-making power to make it an
important player, alongside the legislature, in court admini-
stration. The ballot initiative submitted to the people in 1926
229. See id. at 26-27; see also CAL. CONST. art. VI (Background Comments of
Revision Commission).
230. SEE WHEELER, supra note 10, at 28; see also Harry N. Scheiber, Innova-
tion, Resistance, and Change, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2049, 2080 (1993) ("In the mid-
1920s California joined a widespread movement for the establishment of state-
wide judicial councils that would provide the structure for increased centraliza-
tion of control over court operations.").
231. John Perry Wood, Reform in Judicial Administration, 1 CAL. ST. B.J.
50, 50 (1926).
232. WHEELER, supra note 10, at 29 (quoting BENJAMIN PARKER DEWITT,
THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 156-61 (1915)); see also Wood, supra at note 231,
at 25.
233. See, e.g., Hugh Henry Brown, The Administration of Civil Justice, 1
CAL. ST. B.J. 14 (1926); see also Hugh Henry Brown, Judicial Councils at Work,
1 CAL. ST. B.J. 52 (1926) ("In effect, the Judicial Council will function as a
Board of Directors who supervise in a ministerial way the operation of our judi-
cial industry. It is the injection of a modern business principle into the judicial
system."). Advocates of the Judicial Council Amendment stressed that the
Council would give the courts "an opportunity to put their own house in order"
and "to handle [their] own business." CAL. CONST. art. VI (Background Com-
ments of Revision Commission, 2).
234. See CAL. CONST. art. VI (Background Comments of Revision Commis-
sion, 8) (1966 amend.) ("Most [judicial councils] have power only to investigate
and recommend, and do not possess the limited rule-making power of the Cali-
fornia Judicial Council.").
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would have provided the council with full rule-making
power.. but for the determined opposition of a single legisla-
tor."6 The phrase "not inconsistent with statute" that quali-
fies the council's rule-making power is, therefore, the product
of a legislative compromise rather than the considered judg-
ment of a majority of the legislature regarding the appropri-
ate balance of power between the judiciary and legislature in
court administration.
iii. Phase III: The Professionalization of Court
Administration-the 1960 and 1966 Amendments to
Article VI, Section 6
Although article VI, section 6 has never been amended to
confer the full rule-making power on the Judicial Council, two
amendments in the 1960s accelerated the council's movement
to center-stage in court administration.
Part III of this article described the coming of age of court
administration during the 1960s and 1970s with the
"[e]mergence of separate court administration capabilities" in
the form of offices of court administration staffed with a corps
of professional court administrators. Responding to bur-
geoning caseloads and budget crises, "court administration [in
the 1970s] changed from an innovation.., into an institu-
tionalized part of the judicial landscape."23 ' Today, court ad-
ministration is a profession with managerial and administra-
tive theory and know-how that did not exist thirty-five years
235. Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 15, Introduced by Senator M. B.
Johnson, Jan. 21, 1925, Sec. la ("The Judicial Council shall from time to
time ... (a)dopt or amend rules of practice and procedure for the several courts,
provided, that such rules shall not affect substantive rights and shall be subject
to amendment or repeal by the legislature.").
236. See Brown, Judicial Councils at Work, supra note 233, at 63.
The rule-making power is an integral part of the Judicial Council prin-
ciple. They go hand in hand. The rule-making power was embodied in
Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 15 as originally submitted to
the California legislature. The legislature was overwhelmingly in favor
of it. A single legislator was radically opposed to it. [Through] his op-
position he precipitated a tactical situation which forced the propo-
nents of the measure to relinquish the rule-making power and to con-
sent to its elision from the measure. Doubtless the rule-making power
will be conferred by an early California legislature if the California Ju-
dicial Council shall recommend it.
Id. See also Phil S. Gibson, Chief Justice Urges Effective Plan to Give Courts
Rule-making Power, 15 CAL. ST. B.J. 331, 333 (1940).
237. WHEELER, supra note 10, at 32.
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ago.
238
In 1960, California "joined this nation-wide trend"239 in
the transformation of court administration when the voters
approved an amendment to article VI, section 6 that created
the Office of Court Administration (OCA) within the Judicial
Council.24" For the first time, "the Judicial Council and its
chairman have available to them the power to delegate. In
the absence of such a power to delegate duties it is apparent
that only general decisions, involving primarily broad policy
questions, could result from the Council's deliberations."41
The constitutional creation of the OCA accelerated the Judi-
cial Council's evolution into an effective judicial branch
agency of court administration.242
In addition to the proliferation of offices of court admini-
stration, thirteen states (including California), amended their
constitutions to expressly recognize "court administration" as
a discrete category of rule making, separate from traditional
"practice and procedure."243  Consistent with this national
trend, California voters, in 1966, approved a second amend-
ment to article VI, section 6 that expressly added "court ad-
ministration" to the appropriate subjects of the Judicial
Council's rule-making power.244 The 1966 amendment affirms
that court administration is a core judicial concern and that
238. Id. at 33.
239. See Ralph N. Kleps, The Judicial Council and the Administrative Office
of California Courts, 37 CAL. ST. B.J. 329, 330 (1962).
240. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § la (as amended Nov. 8, 1960) ("The Council
may appoint an administrative director of the courts, who shall hold office at its
pleasure and shall perform such of the duties of the Council and of its chairman,
other than to adopt or amend rules of practice and procedure, as may be dele-
gated to him."). See also Scheiber, supra note 230, at 2081, 2083.
241. Kleps, supra note 239, at 331.
242. See id. ("Creation of an Administrative Office of the Courts means that
there is now an administrative arm for the Council, through which continuous
and effective action can be taken to carry out the policies adopted by the Coun-
cil.").
243. ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.11 (1973); ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15;
ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 5(5); COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 21 (effective Jan. 12, 1965);
DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1994); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18 (1970); N.J. CONST.
art. VI, § II, 3; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 28, 30 (1977) ; PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(c)
(1968); P.R. CONST. art. V, § 7; S.D. CONST. art V, § 12 (1972); TEX. CONST. art.
V, § 31 (1985); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 12 (1984); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 37
(1974).
244. "To improve the administration of justice, the council shall ... adopt
rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not inconsistent with
statute ...." CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (emphasis added).
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the Judicial Council's rule-making power is a critical tool of
court administration.
These two constitutional amendments both promote and
reflect California's commitment to a strong, self-governing ju-
diciary empowered to administer court business profession-
ally and efficiently. CCRA 's broad interpretation of "not in-
consistent with statute," as the standard of rule validity, lags
behind this commitment. The CCRA I court erroneously
chose, as the basis for its interpretation of article VI, section
6, an administrative agency model245 rather than the contem-
porary court administration model embedded in the 1966
amendment. The court's myopic vision of the council's rule-
making power fails to adjust to the dramatic evolution of
court administration in the last half of the twentieth century.
b. The Court's Ambivalence Concerning Strong,
Centralized Court Administration Within the
Judicial Branch
The CCRA I and CCRA II opinions reflect a disrespectful
attitude toward the Judicial Council246 and suggest the courts'
ambivalence over a strong, centralized court administration
within the judicial branch. This ambivalence contributed to
the court's narrow perspective of the council's rule-making
power over court administration. Baar's study of the "judg-
ing-administering distinction" notes the potential for "inter-
role conflict . . . between the administrative and decision-
making spheres."247 Judges called upon to interpret text that
defines judicial power over court administration need to ex-
245. See infra text accompanying notes 343-350.
246. See California Court Reporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 44 (Ct. App. 1995), affd, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997) [CCRA I];
California Court Reporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529
(Ct. App. 1997), affg 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44 (Ct. App. 1995) [CCRA III. Other in-
stances of such language are: "Simply put, the trial court is correct and the Ju-
dicial Council is wrong," id. at 529, and, "Simply stated, the Judicial Council's
asserted inability to understand or comprehend the very language that it sues
is, respectfully, not our problem," id. At the appellate court hearing on Septem-
ber 26, 1995, the three justices went on the attack in questioning the counsel for
the Judicial Council, Richard Chernick, while "the attorney for the court report-
ers went relatively unscathed." Phillip Carrizosa, Argument on Court Reporters
Met With Skepticsm by Justices, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 27, 1995, at 1.
247. Baar hypothesizes that, to minimize this potential conflict, "judicial de-
cision-makers will take administrative policy into account in the judging proc-
ess." Baar, supra note 3, at 620. This did not happen in the court of appeal in
CCRA I.
19991 155
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
amine critically their own attitudes toward court administra-
tion as a non-traditional source of power within the judiciary
that threatens their traditional autonomy.1
48
The metamorphosis of court administration into a new
source of judicial branch power is perceived by judges as well
as legislators as a threat to their respective prerogatives in
court administration.249 Judges have lobbied legislators to re-
sist the proposals of court administrators that interfere with
their traditionally autonomous relationship with their court-
appointed staffs,"' especially court reporters.51
Suspicion by trial and appellate judges of professional
court administrators also stems from divergent professional
training and outlook. This difference in outlook is due in part
to "the inherent differences between the administrative and
the judicial approaches to problem solving and decision
making."5' Judges, in their traditional adjudicative role, are
trained "to individuate each case before them, to observe due
process and insure a reasonably fair, full, and impartial
hearing," while administrators "are trained to view the judi-
ciary from a 'system' level ... carrying a responsibility for
tending to the system's productivity. ,,253 Judge-
administrator conflict has been viewed as a variant of a
larger "clash of cultures" between "professionals" and "man-
agers. 254
248. See Cameron et al., supra note 144, at 455.
A multi-judge court... is an aggregate of independent sovereigns ....
Their independence is traditional and, in regard to the decisional proc-
esses affecting individual cases, essential. Judges and their often indi-
vidually appointed court teams (i.e., bailiffs, court reporters, courtroom
clerks) are difficult to weld into a court-wide, smooth-functioning team.
Judges like lawyers are soloists by training and tradition.
Id.
249. See WHEELER, supra note 10, at 19; see also FISH, supra note 20, at 434.
250. See, e.g., FISH, supra note 20, at 433.
251. See Jean Guccione, Reporters' Pay Can Top Judges' Salaries, L.A. DAILY
J., Aug. 2, 1993, at 10 ("[A]t home, [the court reporters] maintain strong per-
sonal ties with the judges they serve, who often protect their employment
status. 'This is a real bond [with judges],' says Ginger Vadurro, the Los Angeles
Superior court's director of human resources."); see also Tom Dresslar, The Bill
Rejecters, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 3, 1993, at 1 ("The human element also plays a big
part [in the court reporters' lobbying success in the California Legislature], say
observers. The close relationships reporters forge with judges and lawyers aids
their cause.").
252. Cameron et al., supra note 144, at 442.
253. Id. at 472.
254. Id. at 473 (quoting J.A. RAELIN, THE CLASH OF CULTURES (1985)).
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Legislators' suspicion of the motives of court administra-
tors grows as court lobbyists have become increasingly asser-
tive in pressing and opposing legislation affecting court op-
erations.2 5 Relations between the judiciary and legislature
have soured in recent years as a concomitant of the judiciary's
strengthened role in court administration over the past three
decades.256 An erosion of the federal judiciary's credibility
with Congress has been observed:
As with the judiciary's role in statutory development, its
role in rulemaking has been accompanied by a new skepti-
cism of the judiciary's motives and credibility. Represen-
tatives of litigation user groups have accused the Judicial
Conference of being an elitist corps of unelected officials
who are unrepresentative of the public they ostensibly
serve in the rulemaking process and whose rulemaking
activities are influenced if not dictated by self-interest.
2
"1
The mutual mistrust of increasingly powerful court ad-
ministrators shared by some judges and legislators makes
them natural allies. This community of interest may par-
tially explain the CCRA I court's pro-legislature position on
court administration. The California judiciary is also acutely
aware of its vulnerability to legislative backlash. Two years
before CCRA I, in 1992, the legislature almost slashed the ju-
diciary's budget in retaliation against a decision that under-
mined the prerogatives of legislative veterans .2  The decision
rejected, in forceful terms, the legislature's constitutional
challenge to Proposition 140, which imposed term limits on
legislators and cut the legislature's budget.259 Acknowledging
the strained relations between the courts and the legislature,
[Pirofessionals ... are socialized through their disciplines and culture
to carry out their technical responsibilities as members of a profes-
sional group ... [that] typically cause[s] them to experience diffi-
culty.., in conforming to the direction of management .... Managers
[on the other hand] .. . are expected to learn the bulk of their craft on
the job. The corporate culture, which strongly influences their sociali-
zation, defines the managerial role essentially as articulating the goals
of the organization and devising procedures to meet them.
Cameron et al., supra note 144, at n.86.
255. See Baar, supra note 3, at 631-32.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 148-149.
257. Geyh, supra note 146, at 1211.
258. Legislature of the State of California v. March Fong Eu, 816 P.2d 1309
(Cal. 1991).
259. See Bill Ainsworth, Battle of the Branches-The Supreme Court vs. the
Legislature, 24 CAL. J., Jan. 1, 1993, at 21, 21.
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the Judicial Council placed the renewal of legislative rela-
tions, 6' along with preservation of judicial independence, at
the top of its agenda.26'
The CCRA I decision should also be read against the
backdrop of a surprisingly large number of recusals, at the
request of court reporters, by judges at each stage of the ad-
judicatory process. 62 At the trial level, the entire Alameda
County Superior Court recused itself because the court's chief
executive officer was a named defendant.263 At the court of
appeal, Justice Carl Anderson recused himself because of
membership on a Judicial Council advisory committee.64 Fi-
nally, half of the supreme court justices abstained from voting
on the Judicial Council's appeal petition.265 While two of the
abstaining justices were members of the Judicial Council, the
other two were not. Justices Baxter and Werdegar merely
served on the council's standing appellate advisory commit-
tee, which reviewed and supported the challenged rules.266
It is surprising that the court reporters' challenges to im-
partiality succeeded in the judicial arena. 67 Most courts, in-
260. See Chief Justice Ronald M. George, State of the Judiciary Address to a
Joint Session of the California Legislature (Feb. 23, 1998).
261. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA LONG-RANGE STRATEGIC PLAN,
LEADING JUSTICE INTO THE FUTURE (1995).
262. Letters from CCRA counsel to the four supreme court justices stated in
part:
We are writing because we believe that the facts require your honor's
recusal for involvement in the proceedings in the case,.... Because of
your honor's role [on] a Judicial Council committee that approved the
rules at issue, a person aware of the facts "might reasonably entertain
a doubt" about your honor's impartiality in a case to which the Judicial
Council is a party and which concerns the legality of those rules.
Scott Graham, Judicial Council Foes Ask Recusal of Four Justices, THE
RECORDER, Dec. 26, 1995, at 42 [hereinafter Graham, Judicial Council Foes Ask
Recusal].
263. See Scott Graham, No Holds Barred in Court Reporting Case; Politics,
Judicial Conflicts, Fiscal Crisis Invoked in Flurry of Court Filings, THE
RECORDER, Jan. 4, 1996, at 39.
264. Id.
265. See also Scott Graham, Judicial Council Loses Bid to Revive Reporting
Case, THE RECORDER, Feb. 7, 1996, at 34.
266. See Graham, Judicial Foes Ask Recusal, supra note 262, at 42.
267. In response to the court reporters' charge that the Judicial Council could
not be trusted to objectively evaluate the electronic recording demonstration
project, the legislature amended A.B. 825 and A.B. 1854 to require a parallel
report by a legislative advisory committee. See supra text accompanying notes
72-73.
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cluding the U.S. Supreme Court,268 do not question the propri-
ety of judging the validity of court-promulgated rules. '
These recusals paint a picture of a judiciary on the defensive
and in retreat from confrontation with the CCRA. These re-
cusals may have also tilted the playing field by eliminating
the very judges most acquainted with the needs of court ad-
ministration. Thus, the many recusals, the clashes between
court administrators and judges, and the distrust of the Judi-
cial Council by legislators combine to reflect the ambivalence
of the CCRA I court to permit a strong centralized court ad-
ministration within the Judicial Branch.
3. What the Court Should Have Done: A New Approach to
Determining Conflict Between Rules of Court and
Statutes in Court Administration
a. Form over Dysfunction: The Primacy of Legislative
Intent in California
California courts are firmly committed to the traditional
intentionalist model of statutory interpretation, 7 ' which flows
from California's populist tradition of legislative supremacy
forged during the state's formative years and imprinted on
the judicial subconscious.27' The California Supreme Court
recently confirmed that the courts' "limited role in the process
of interpreting enactments from the political branches of our
state government ... [is to] strive to ascertain and effectuate
the Legislature's intent."272 The intentionalist model requires
the courts to blind themselves to dysfunction in the legislative
process that may have produced rent-seeking legislation.7 3
The California Supreme Court recently affirmed: "In inter-
preting statutes, we follow the Legislature's intent ... what-
ever may be thought of the wisdom, expediency, or policy of
the act .... [Tihe judicial role in a democratic society is fun-
268. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (upholding the validity of
FED. R. Civ. P. 35 and 37).
269. See Grau, supra note 133, at 13 ("State supreme courts, however, have
not hesitated to rule on the validity of their own rules.").
270. People v. Snook, 947 P.2d 808, 810 (Cal. 1997).
271. See infra Part V.A.I.a and Part V.A.2.a.
272. People v. Loeun, 947 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Cal. 1997) (quoting from Califor-
nia Teachers Ass'n. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 1175,
1177 (Cal. 1997)).
273. See Schacter, Metademocracy, supra note 159, at 597.
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damentally to interpret laws, not to write them."'74
California courts must move beyond intentionalism when
interpreting text that affects the scope of the judiciary's
power to promulgate rules affecting court administration.
Such text is pregnant with separation-of-powers policy con-
cerns. In resolving textual ambiguity, California courts
should fully acknowledge their inevitable policy-making role
in calibrating the balance of power between the judicial and
legislative branches in court administration. This calibration
should keep pace with the evolution of court administration
into a powerful judicial branch instrument of self-governance
that is the key to judicial independence. Judicial independ-
ence requires a narrow construction of article VI, section 6's
"not inconsistent with statute," which precludes the court
from reading into statutes an implicit intent and a suggested
statutory scheme that are not clearly expressed in the terms
of the statute. A narrow construction of "not inconsistent
with statute" would require courts to narrowly interpret am-
biguous statutes that bear upon court administration.275
The proper, narrow construction of "not inconsistent with
statute," is the trial court's "impossibl[e] of concurrent opera-
tion or effect," rather than merely "inharmonious," standard.
This standard is premised on a vision of the council's rule-
making power as "parallel" with that of the legislature, as
long as the council's rules do not clearly undercut statutory
procedure.276
The work of the new generation of statutory construction
theories, such as dynamic interpretation and meta-
democratic interpretation, provides the basis for bringing the
interpretation of "not inconsistent with statute" into align-
ment with the contemporary concepts of judicial self-
governance and independence. Contemporary statutory in-
terpretation scholarship challenges the California courts to
move beyond the reflexive invocation of strict legislative in-
tent and legislative supremacy-initially, in the area of court
administration-to a candid, critical reassessment of their
274. California Teachers Ass'n, 927 P.2d at 1177.
275. See Walker v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 807 P.2d 418 (Cal. 1991)
(interpreting statutes narrowly by California Supreme Court to avoid trenching
on the inherent power of the courts to govern themselves).
276. Statement of Intended Decision at 19, CCRA I, supra note 1.
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277
role in the interpretation process.
CCRA I exposes judicial administration to interest group
control that is not clearly authorized by statute. The Califor-
nia courts should self-consciously use their interpretation
power to support the Judicial Council's rule-making power as
an effective tool of efficient, businesslike court administration
by reconciling rule of court with statute where the text rea-
sonably supports such reconciliation.278 The result will be a
narrower interpretation of "conflict" that gives the council
latitude and flexibility to govern the courts with business effi-
ciency-as intended by the state bar sponsors of the 1926
amendment and the 1966 amendment.
In the field of court administration, the courts, through
dynamic and meta-democratic interpretation, should update
nineteenth century populist notions. Those notions are (1)
the passive role of the courts as merely discoverers and en-
forcers of legislative (or popular) intent,27 9 acknowledging the
reality that courts themselves, in partnership with the legis-
lature (or the people), are inevitably sources of policy, par-
ticularly in the area of court administration;28 9 and (2) judicial
dependency on the legislature (or its local county equivalent)
in matters of court administration, acknowledging the emer-
gence of the Judicial Council as a powerful judicial branch
agency of court administration that is the bulwark of judicial
277. See Schacter, Metademocracy, supra note 159, at 593-94 ("To carry out
its task, the court must adopt-at least implicitly-a theory about its own role
by defining the goal and methodology of the interpretive enterprise and by tak-
ing an institutional stance in relation to the legislature.").
278. The California Constitutional Revision Commission that proposed the
1966 amendment to article VI, section 6 stated:
[Ilt should be remembered that while the Judicial Council is empow-
ered only to formulate rules "not inconsistent with law(s)," it is the
courts which have attempted to strike down rules promulgated by the
Judicial Council, it is the courts which determine whether or not such a
conflict exists. A number of cases have attempted to strike down rules
promulgated by the Judicial Council as conflicting with law, but gener-
ally without success.
CAL. CONST. art. VI (Background Comments of Revision Commission, 5).
279. Schacter describes the traditional role of the courts as "in essence, to
erase its own role-that is, to limit its interpretive work to a fairly mechanical
retrieval of legislative meaning." Schacter, Metademocracy, supra note 159, at
597.
280. "If statutory meaning is necessarily created both by interpretation and
by legislation, the very premises of the essentialist account are shaken, for leg-
islative majorities cannot retain sole responsibility for making statutory policy
choices." Schacter, Metademocracy, supra note 159, at 603.
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independence.
b. A Match Between Court Administration and
Dynamic Interpretation
Article VI, section 6 provides fertile ground for applica-
tion of dynamic and meta-democratic interpretation method-
ology for the following reasons.
i. "Not Inconsistent with Statute" is "Open-
Textured"281-There Are No Clear Signals to the
Courts from the Legislature or the People
The constitutional phrase "not inconsistent with statute"
is ambiguous on its face.282 These words, in essence, articu-
late the amorphous concept of "conflict" between a court rule
and a statute that is not unique to judicial administration in
California. Courts construe conflict narrowly or broadly de-
pending on their particular calibration of the balance of insti-
tutional interests between the judicial and legislative
branches. 83 Regardless of the rhetoric deployed by a court to
explain its resolution of the conflict issue before it, conflict is
an elastic concept that stretches to fit the interpreting court's
view of the appropriate balance of institutional interests be-
tween the legislature and the courts and, therefore, does not
benefit from a traditional legislative or popular intent-based
281. "Open-textured" is used to mean statutory ambiguity that requires the
exercise of interpretive discretion. See Eskridge, Spinning Legislative Suprem-
acy, supra note 177, at 323-24. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 121-32 (1961).
282. The enacting legislature may have deliberately opted to use vague terms
to describe the limits on the Judicial Council's rule-making power. The limita-
tion on the council's rule-making power represented by these words was the re-
sult of the opposition of a single legislator. See supra Part V.A.2.a.ii.
283. In contrast to CCRA I's broad interpretation of "not inconsistent with
statute," the New Jersey Supreme Court's 1950 decision in Winberry v. Salis-
bury, 74 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1950) provides an example of an aggressive court that
narrowly construes an ambiguous constitutional limitation on the court's rule-
making power in order to stake out for itself an exclusive rule-making role. The
New Jersey Constitution provides: "The Supreme Court shall make rules gov-
erning the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to law, the prac-
tice and procedure in all such courts." N.J. CONST. art. VI, § II, 3 (emphasis
added). In an opinion written by Chief Justice Vanderbilt, a leading advocate of
the restoration of the rule-making power to the courts, the supreme court inter-
preted the ambiguous phrase "subject to law" to mean only substantive statutes,
not procedural statutes. Through this narrow construction of "subject to law,"
the New Jersey Supreme Court assumed a dominant position over the legisla-
ture in procedural rule making.
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analysis.
The CCRA I court's interpretation of "not inconsistent
with statute" was not dictated by supreme court precedent.
Nor does the legislative history behind the original 1926
proposition or the 1966 amendment provide any direct guid-
ance on the meaning of "not inconsistent with statute." Based
upon the written record, the issue was simply not anticipated.
Not surprisingly, court administration and separation of pow-
ers issues fall outside the field of vision of most voters. Even
the lawyers who sponsored these measures, and the legisla-
ture that voted to place the propositions on the ballot, did not
discuss how to determine conflict between rule and statute.284
The California courts should no longer hide behind the
myth of "popular intent" to escape the candid exercise of in-
terpretive discretion of ballot initiatives, especially constitu-
tional amendments, that implicate separation of powers the-
285
ory.
ii. The Rapid Evolution of Court Administration,
Nationally and in California, Requires California
Courts to Use the Interpretation Process to Update
Article VI, Section 6
Over the course of the twentieth century, the concept of
court administration within the judicial branch has under-
gone a transformation that parallels the revolution in verba-
tim recording technology. The text of Article VI, section 6
that confers rule-making power on the council, and its
amendment in 1966 to expressly include "court administra-
tion," reflect this rapid evolution toward a more central and
284. The record indicates that the sponsors of the 1926 amendment expected
that the Council would soon receive full rule-making power and, therefore,
viewed the qualified rule-making power as an interim arrangement. See supra
note 236.
285. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Suprem-
acy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 287 (1989).
The essence of the strong conception is that judges are "just following
orders" without regard to their own views of public policy. When direc-
tives are clear, this is a sound justification. But when the directives are
reasonably open to conflicting interpretations (as is often the case), we
should be reluctant to excuse judges from responsibility for their own
actions on the ground that they were just implementing directives from
above.
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assertive role for the judiciary in court administration.8 '
Courts sometimes cling to "traditional, time-tested [public]
values"87 and exhibit a reluctance "to expand... public val-
ues, or update them to reflect important changes in society
and moral theory." Through dynamic interpretation, Califor-
nia courts should update the meaning of "not inconsistent
with statute"-by narrowly interpreting this phrase-to nur-
ture a vigorous rule-making power in court administration
that enables direct judicial accountability to the public.
Rapid technological change, which is transforming the
justice system, engenders statutory obsolescence. It is demo-
cratically legitimate for courts to narrowly construe old, tech-
nologically obsolete statutes to give the judiciary the neces-
sary flexibility to utilize technology most efficiently and
effectively.
iii. California Courts Should Reinterpret "Not
Inconsistent with Statute" to Preserve Public Values
of Judicial Independence and Efficiency Inherent in
Article VI, Section 6 as Amended in 1966
The phrase "not inconsistent with statute" is imbued
with constitutional values concerning the proper balance of
legislative and judicial authority over court administration.
CCRA !'s interpretation of "not inconsistent with statute" to
mean "consistent with an implied legislative intent suggested
by a statutory scheme"288 is, in effect, a presumption in favor
of legislative preemption of the Judicial Council's rule-making
power. The California courts should reverse this presump-
tion. Unless the legislature clearly manifested its intent to
preempt the council, the courts should narrowly interpret
court administration statutes to permit the Judicial Council
to make effective use of its rule-making power over court ad-
ministration.
Dynamic interpretation methodology supports this ap-
proach. Current public values often inform statutory inter-
pretation, especially where text is ambiguous and legislative
286. See supra Part V.A.2.a.
287. Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 13, at
1086.
288. California Court Reporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 44, 50 (Ct. App. 1995), affd, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997).
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history inconclusive.289 One of the three general rules of
statutory interpretation "that reflect the gravitational force of
constitutional values"29 ° is the "[ilnterpretation [of statutes] to
[p]reserve [t]raditional [s]eparation of [r]esponsibilities in
[glovernment."29' The Judicial Council is institutionally more
competent than the legislature to draft procedural rules.292
The courts should, therefore, apply a meta-rule of statutory
interpretation that presumes that legislative enactments do
not eclipse rules of court unless statutes expressly so provide.
iv. Who Will Speak for the Courts?: California
Courts Should Be Alert to Legislative Dysfunction in
Interpreting "Not Inconsistent with Statute" in
Article VI, Section 6 and Court Administration
Statutes
The phrase "not inconsistent with statute" in article VI,
section 6, as well as the enactment of, and failure to enact,
assorted statutes regulating the verbatim record in the last
thirty years, are the product of legislative dysfunction. The
CCRA I court ignored these historical facts. The enactment of
the electronic recording demonstration project bills (Civil Pro-
cedure Code section 270) was not a rational, deliberative deci-
sion by the legislature that electronic recording was an un-
289. See Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 13,
at 1065 ("In many cases, the public values presumptions operate as 'tiebreakers'
in the close cases, where there are good textual and legislative history argu-
ments for different interpretations."); see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 167;
see also Schacter, Metademocracy, supra note 159, at 606 ("The critique of plu-
ralism creates a normative gap, which requires the court to identify political
values that will guide its analysis and its choice of an interpretative rule.").
290. Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 13, at
1019.
291. Id. at 1023.
292. Referring to increasing direct congressional intervention in the federal
rule-making process over the last 20 years, Professor Carrington writes:
In contrast [to rule making by the courts], our legislatures serve as fo-
rums of faction....
Given a choice or an opportunity, most factions will try to claim the
judiciary not only to control the selection of judges, but also to bend
court administration and procedural rules to their own advantages.
What vibrant political organizations want is not good procedure or due
process, but victory for the interests they represent .... Perhaps the
most outspoken of all [factional interests] are the court reporters who
resist modification of rule 30 to allow the taking of depositions without
requiring their services.
Carrington, supra note 223, at 162-65.
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proven technology that needed to be tested. Rather, it was
the product of a political compromise forced by the CCRA's
political opposition to the original bills expressly authorizing
electronic recording in all superior courts indefinitely.293
Similarly, the CCRA I court took note of the "[1] egislature's
rejection of the Judicial Council's proposed amendments [to
existing statute]" as reinforcing the court's interpretation of
"the existing statutory scheme,"294 ignoring the political real-
ity of the court reporters' power in the Legislature.299
Dynamic interpretation and meta-democratic methodol-
ogy challenges the validity of the optimistic assumption that
pluralism produces good-public interest-legislation. The
courts have a legitimate role to play in compensating for dys-
function and in speaking for the disenfranchised. This role is
particularly suited to the interpretation of judicial admini-
stration statutes because special interests frequently drown
out the voice of the judiciary in the legislature. 9 '
California courts must be alert to "rent-seeking" statutes
"that... represent advantage-taking"9 ' by special interest
groups when interpreting those statutes to determine incon-
sistency with rules of court. These courts should "focus on
what can go wrong, and where"99 in the legislature, especially
to the "primary legislative dysfunctions identified by public
choice theory-a tendency of Congress to neglect general in-
terest statutes and of Congress and agencies to create special
rules and benefits for well-organized groups." 9 "Courts can
ameliorate . . . [legislative] dysfunction by narrowly inter-
preting rent-seeking statutes and by adopting public-
293. See supra text accompanying notes 51-64.
294. California Court Reporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 44, 56 (Ct. App. 1995), affd, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997).
295. Petition for Review at 6-8, CCRA I, supra note 1 (suggesting that the
legislature's repeated failure to enact electronic recording bills does not reflect a
legislative intent to preclude electronic recording from superior courts but,
rather, the political muscle of the CCRA).
296. But see Jonathan R. Macy, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM L. REV.
223, 256 (1986) (advocating "the use of traditional methods of statutory inter-
pretation as the best means of addressing the problem of special interest group
legislation").
297. Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 147, at 323.
298. Id. at 322.
299. Id. at 322.
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regarding interpretations of regulatory statutes." °0
These observations are especially applicable to court ad-
ministration. Court personnel-from individual judges to
court reporters--commonly pursue their self-interest through
statute."' The politicization of court procedure by special-
interest-group legislative lobbying over the last twenty years
is a well-documented phenomenon. Also, court reform meas-
ures, inevitably upsetting the status quo, are often blocked or
modified by powerful private interests in the legislature.0
Judicial administrators, lobbying for public-regarding in court
reform, are often overwhelmed in legislatures by tightly or-
ganized, well-financed special interest groups who-unlike
the judiciary-make campaign contributions.3 There is no
strong public lobby in the legislature.0 4
California courts should modify their traditionally pas-
sive interpretive role in the area of court administration by
being "alert"00 to legislative dysfunction and willing to use
the process of interpretation of ambiguous text to compensate
for that dysfunction. In CCRA I, the court should have mini-
300. Id. at 318.
301. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 7 ("[Als human beings, judges have an un-
derstandable self-interest in shaping court structures and procedures in ways
that preserve their powers and privileges. Their actions affecting judicial ad-
ministration frequently reflect their shared self-interest.").
302. See FISH, supra note 20, at 432-33 (referring to the power of individual
federal judges to frustrate judicial reform).
Each of these measures would exert decided centripetal impulses
through the federal court system. Each would threaten or appear to
threaten the hallowed ground of judicial independence. More realisti-
cally every one would be seen as subverting existing status relation-
ships by changing the internal distribution of power within the judicial
system.
Id. See also Cameron et al., supra note 144, at 444 n.13 (quoting Judge Dorothy
W. Nelson, 1982 CT. MGMT. J. 26, 27) ("[O]n balance .... the self-interest of
powerful individuals, institutions, and groups rarely weighs in favor of judicial
reform.").
303. See Geyh, supra note 146, at 1216-17.
304. See Carrington, supra note 223, at 162.
Alas, there is ... no natural and effective lobby for sound judicial ad-
ministration, no political force that regularly favors impartiality or
disinterest. Judicial institutions, like the shoemakers children, are un-
shod when they walk the corridors of legislation. When one sees the
representatives of the Third Branch on Capitol Hill, one is prone to
wonder, how many divisions has the Pope? What is everyone's concern,
as the old saw has it, is nobody's business.
Id.
305. See Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 147.
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mized the impact of the dysfunction that resulted in the in-
sertion of "not inconsistent with statute" into article VI, sec-
tion 6 by narrowly construing that phrase to support the
Council's rule-making power in court administration.3"6 As
long as the interest group demand °7 for procedural legislation
continues unabated, it is unlikely that the legislature will
voluntarily loosen its grip on the rule-making power.0 8
Bypassing the legislature by direct recourse to the people
to complete the council's rule-making power will also be un-
availing because the public lacks interest in, and under-
standing of, court administration.3 9 The court obviously can-
not delete this phrase-which can only be accomplished by
constitutional amendment-but the court can, with demo-
cratic legitimacy, minimize its adverse impact on judicial ad-
ministration, especially where a broad interpretation would
open the door to further legislative dysfunction by special in-
terest groups.3 10
306. See California Court Reporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 44 (Ct. App. 1995), affd, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997). This
narrow interpretation of "not inconsistent with statute" supports the trial
court's interpretation as not just "inharmonious," but connoting an impossibility
of concurrent operation or effect. See infra Part II.D.
307. See Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 147, at 285 ("Public
choice theorists typically treat legislation as an economic transaction in which
interest groups form the demand side, and legislators form the supply side. On
the whole, this branch of public choice theory demonstrates that the market for
legislation is a badly functioning one.").
308. See California Law Revision rejection of the author's proposal that the
Commissioner advocate the transfer of complete rule-making power to the Judi-
cial Council: "[Tihe Commissioner has now reviewed this matter and decided
not to take it on. It implicates the balance of power between the legislative and
judicial branches .... It would not be appropriate for the Commissioner to step
into the argument at this point." Letter to Glenn Koppel from Nathaniel Ster-
ling, Executive Secretary, California Law Revision Commission (Mar. 3, 1999)
(on file with the author).
309. See Kala Rogers Holt, The Balance of Power: Weidrick v. Arnold and the
Conflict Over Legislative and Judicial Rulemaking Authority in Arkansas, 46
ARK. L. REV. 627, 654 (1993) ("It is highly questionable whether the struggle
between the judicial and legislative branches over rulemaking authority will
stimulate sufficient public interest for an initiative petition to be successful.
Indeed, obtaining a constitutional amendment regarding rulemaking through
the initiative process is less probable than proceeding through legislative proce-
dure.").
310. The court also should have narrowly construed the court reporting stat-
utes rather than infer that they comprise a rational scheme that bars electronic
recording from superior court except where expressly authorized. See infra Part
V.B.
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c. Proposed Dynamic Interpretation Methodology for
Interpreting Verbatim Recording Statutes
Interpreted dynamically, the phrase "not inconsistent
with statute" is itself a dynamic interpretation methodology
for interpreting the verbatim recording statutes. Dynamic in-
terpretation theory does not offer a mechanical, by-the-
numbers, formula for interpreting the court reporter statutes.
Rather, it encourages judges to shed the pretense of mechani-
cally extracting and enforcing "legislative intent" in favor of
an open-minded "dialogue" between the judge and statutory
text. Through this dialogue, the judge, as interpreter, strives
to find common ground between his own contemporary con-
text of assumptions and that of the enacting legislature.
Applying this dialogue methodology to the interpretation
of statutes that regulate court administration, California
courts should reject CCRA Is approach that requires the
court to begin its analysis with the fixed assumption that
there is a rational, public-regarding, legislative design or
scheme and then to endeavor to force the statutory pieces to
fit that scheme. Instead, the court should start its analysis
by focusing on the words of the text of each statute, "con-
sider[ing] the most plausible meaning of the words used in
the text, with due consideration for the whole text."' If there
is no conflict between the statutory text and the challenged
rule of court, the court should uphold the rule's validity. 12
This first analytical step is consistent with California's cur-
rent intentionalist methodology as articulated in a recent de-
cision of the California Supreme Court: "In determining the
Legislature's intent, a court looks first to the words of the
statute .... '[I]t is the language of the statute itself that has
successfully braved the legislative gauntlet'. . . . When look-
ing to the words of the statute, a court gives the language its
usual, ordinary meaning.""3 For example, if the legislature
311. Eskridge, Spinning Legislative Supremacy, supra note 177, at 346.
312. See Farber, supra note 285, at 291-92 ("The ultimate question is
whether genuine doubt exists about the meaning of the legislative command.").
This assumes, of course, that it is possible for a text to communicate a clear
meaning.
313. People v. Snook, 947 P.2d 808, 811 (Cal. 1997). See also People v.
Loeun, 947 P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1997):
We give the words of the statute "their usual and ordinary mean-
ing."... If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, "then
the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain
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had enacted a statute that expressly banned the use of elec-
tronic recording technology to make the verbatim record in
superior court, the process of analysis ends and the court de-
clares invalid any rule of court authorizing electronic record-
ing in superior court.
If the court believes the statutory text is ambiguous, it
should study the text in light of the statute's "legislative his-
tory, its purpose(s), the evolution of its purpose(s) over time,
and precedents concerning the statute's application in other
circumstances."31 This approach accords great weight to the
"statute's integrity... and the truths that come from its his-
tory,"1' but then brings those truths forward to the present
day to reconcile them with contemporary values and condi-
tions. Such conditions include, of course, fundamental
changes in verbatim recording technology and court admini-
stration. In studying the statute's history, the court should
identify "problems in the democratic process" that may have
produced rent-seeking, "monopoly," legislation that benefits a
powerful interest group at the expense of the public interest.
B. Critique of Parts B and C the CCRA I Opinion: Statutory
Interpretation-The Illusory Quest for the Holy Grail of
Legislative Intent
1. What the CCRA I Court Said It Was Doing, But Wasn't
a. Part B of the Opinion: The Implied Statutory
Scheme
The CCRA I court reviewed the text of a variety of stat-
utes regulating the appointment, duties, and compensation of
official court reporters, as well as two statutes relating to
electronic recording-one authorizing electronic recording in
municipal court if a court reporter is unavailable, the other
authorizing the now-defunct demonstration project. Based
upon this review, the court discerned a "legislative pattern
meaning of the language governs."... Where the statute is clear,
courts will not "interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity
that does not exist."
Id. at 1317 (quoting Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd., 885 P.2d 976, 978 (Cal.
1994)).
314. Eskridge, Spinning Legislative Supremacy, supra note 177, at 347.
315. Id.
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[that] suggests that while electronic recording is sometimes
proper, the normal practice is that a shorthand reporter is to
create the official record unless statutory law provides other-
wise."16
The CCRA I court failed to deliver on its promise to "look
to the Legislature's purpose at the time the statutory scheme
was enacted."1' Instead, the court laid out the text of these
statutes in their current form as they appear in the Code of
Civil Procedure31 and in the Government Code.319 By doing
so, the statutes appeared as though they had been enacted by
a single, rational, contemporary legislature that set out to
craft a comprehensive verbatim reporting scheme for making
the "official record" that best served the public interest.
These fictional legislators were, presumably, aware of the
modern verbatim recording technologies, carefully deliberated
on the pros and cons of shorthand versus electronic recording,
and rationally determined that shorthand was the only reli-
able verbatim reporting technology.
Rather than evaluate each statute in its historical con-
text, the court invented its fictional, rational-purpose, statu-
tory scheme. The court erroneously began its statutory
analysis with Code of Civil Procedure section 26920 as the
foundation for inferring that there is a "statutory scheme
providing for the official record to be taken down in short-
hand."12 ' The court's implication that section 269 is the key-
316. California Court Reporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 44, 54 (Ct. App. 1995), affd, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997).
317. Id. at 55.
318. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 269(a) (Deering Supp. 1999) (setting forth
the duties of an official court reporter; but mischaracterized by the court as set-
ting forth the "basic provisions for requesting an official superior court record")
(emphasis added). See also id. § 270 (the expired demonstration project); id. §
273 (making the official reporter's certified transcript prima facie evidence of
the proceedings).
319. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68086 (Deering 1989 & Supp. 1999) (setting the
fees and costs of an official reporter). See also id. § 69941 (authorizing the su-
perior court judge to appoint an official reporter); id. § 69952 (prohibiting the
court from authorizing payment for "any matter except that reported by the [of-
ficial] reporter pursuant to Section 269 of the Code of Civil Procedure"); id.
§§ 69948, 70044.5-70064 (prescribing compensation for official reporters ac-
cording to fee schedules); id. at § 72194.5 (authorizing electronic recording in
municipal court whenever an official court reporter is unavailable).
320. "Several statutes comprise the statutory scheme of making an official
record. Subdivision (a) of section 269 sets out the basic provisions for requesting
an official superior court record." See CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51.
321. Id. at 55.
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stone of a scheme for creating something called the "official
record" and that the legislature mandated that only the offi-
cial reporter can create that record is unwarranted both by
the text of section 269 and its history.
Had the court referred to history, it would have com-
menced its analysis with Government Code section 69941,
which authorizes, but by no means requires, the superior
court judge to appoint an official reporter.2 No statute re-
quires that a superior court appoint an official court reporter
at all. The superior court's exercise of the power to appoint
court reporters is entirely discretionary. All other sections of
the Civil Procedure and Government Codes cited by the court
assume that the superior court has, in fact, exercised its dis-
cretion in favor of appointing an official court reporter under
Government Code 69941. Code of Civil Procedure section
269(a) simply defines the duty of the official reporter to take
down in shorthand the oral proceedings, but only if requested
to do so by the parties or the court.12' No statute requires that
the superior court maintain an official record. An official rec-
ord exists only if an official court reporter, upon request, pre-
pares a verbatim record of proceedings.
The legislature's original purpose in 1861 was most likely
to make available to the court, or the parties, a reliable
source of the only verbatim recording technology available at
the time, should the court or one of the parties desire a verba-
tim record.124 The enacting legislature, in 1861, could not pos-
sibly have intended to exclude an electronic technology of
which it could not have even dreamed. In fact, had a reliable
electronic recording technology been available in 1861, the
legislature would likely have embraced it given the scarcity of
competent shorthand reporters on the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury frontier 25 (especially because the court reporters had not
organized as a profession and lobbying force until the late
nineteenth century).
b. Part C of the Opinion: The Legislature's Failure to
Enact a Statute that Expressly Authorizes
322. See supra notes 21-256 and accompanying text.
323. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 269a (Deering Supp. 1999).
324. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
325. Id.
326. See supra note 23.
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Electronic Recording in Superior Court:
The court purports to reject the CCRA's invitation "to
consider-as further evidence of an intent not to permit elec-
tronic recording-the Legislature's subsequent failure to pass
legislation proposed by the Judicial Council specifically
authorizing electronic recording."27
As in Part A, the court says one thing and does another.
The court analogizes the Judicial Council to a legislatively
created administrative agency, 28 drawing upon case law that
finds legislative rejection of a proposal identical to the chal-
lenged agency regulation as "more persuasive" evidence that
the regulation is inconsistent with legislative intent.329 Based
upon this inapposite case law, the court states: "In our case,
the Judicial Council's attempt to obtain legislative amend-
ment of the existing statutory scheme suggests that its pres-
ent interpretation of that scheme as consistent with the rules
it promulgated after rejection of the amendments is shaky, at
best. 3
0
The court makes two errors here. First, the Judicial
Council is not a creature of the legislature that exists solely to
carry out the legislative will. Second, the challenged rules of
court were not the same as the "rejected amendments" re-
ferred to by the court. Rule 980.1 would have authorized
electronic recording in superior court only where an official
court reporter was "unavailable." By contrast, the Isenberg
bill, Assembly Bill 2937, sponsored by the Judicial Council at
the sunset of the demonstration project in 1992, would have
given unqualified authorization to a court to "utilize audio or
video recording as the means of making a verbatim record of
any hearing or proceeding" whether or not an official reporter
was available.3 ' This distinction is significant because the
327. California Court Reporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 44, 55 (Ct. App. 1995), afd, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997).
When determining the meaning of statutory language, our high court
recently held that very limited guidance can generally be drawn from
the fact that the Legislature has not enacted a particular proposed
amendment to an existing statutory scheme .... As evidence of legis-
lative intent, unadopted proposals have been held to have little value.
Id.
328. Id. at 56.
329. Id. at 55-56.
330. Id. at 56.
331. A.B. No. 2937 § 3 (Cal. 1985).
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courts are not required by statute to appoint official court re-
porters-in other words, to make them "available." The ap-
pointment authority conferred by Government Code section
69941 and the other court reporting statutes is purely discre-
tionary. Code Civil Procedure section 269(a) gives a party the
right to have an official reporter make a verbatim record upon
request, but only if one is available. Assembly Bill 2937, in
contrast to the Electronic Recording Rules, would have
authorized a superior or municipal court judge to utilize elec-
tronic recording to make a verbatim record, even if an official
reporter were available, thereby cutting into Code of Civil
Procedure section 269(a).
Finally, the court draws a questionable inference from
the Judicial Council's failed efforts to secure legislative
authorization of electronic recording in superior court that,
"[b]y its conduct, the Judicial Council impliedly admitted that
legislative authorization is needed before electronic recording
of superior court proceedings may be made." Legislative
history indicates that the council sought express statutory
authorization because judges were unsure of their inherent
authority to use electronic technology in light of perceived
statutory ambiguity. The council's repeated efforts to have
the legislature resolve this ambiguity, rather than the council
through its own rule-making power, can reasonably be inter-
preted as a political choice to defer to the legislature as a
matter of comity and to use its own rule-making power only
as a last resort. The Judicial Council knows that the legisla-
ture is jealous of its rule-making prerogatives333 and, also,
that legislators who suspect an overreaching judiciary are
quite capable of retaliation.
33 4
The court completely ignores the political clout wielded
by the CCRA in the legislature, which enables the CCRA to
kill, or critically injure, electronic recording bills. The legisla-
ture's repeated failure to enact a statute that expressly
authorizes electronic recording in superior court is evidence of
the power of the CCRA to preserve its monopoly over verba-
332. CCRA 1, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56.
333. See Statement of Bruce Enerson, Member of the Commission on Consti-
tutional Revision, to the Constitutional Revision Commission re: 1966 Amend-
ment to Article VI, § 6 (Nov. 7, 1964) ("[Tihe Legislature has been very careful
to preserve its authority to deal with the procedure in the courts.").
334. See Ainsworth, supra note 259.
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tim reporting in superior court. However, this failure to en-
act statutes is not evidence of a statutory scheme to permit
only shorthand court reporting.
2. What the CCRA I Court Was Really Doing:
Deploying legislative intent rhetoric-that it was "just
following orders"--the court, not the legislature, constructed
a scheme for maintaining the "official" verbatim record that is
unsupported by history or text. With a minimum of analysis,
and no exploration of historical context, CCRA I essentially
recites the text of selected sections of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure and Government Code. By reviewing the statutes in the
order in which they appear as code sections, beginning with
Code of Civil Procedure section 269(a),"'5 rather than Gov-
ernment Code section 69941, the CCRA I court distorts the
"meaning" of these code sections by making it appear as
though the legislature mandated the use of shorthand court
reporting to the exclusion of other technologies. Instead,
Government Code section 69941 gives superior court judges
the option to hire official court reporters and, thereby, make
available to litigants a reliable means for making a verbatim
record-in fact, the only reliable means known to the enact-
ing legislators in 1861.36 In essence, the court's interpreta-
tion amounts to a judicial preemption-on behalf of the leg-
islature-of the judiciary's rule-making power over court
administration in an area that is a core concern to court ad-
ministration. The court, not the legislature, thereby wrested
from judicial hands state-of-the-art technological tools that
the courts, after successful hands-on experience, determined
will improve the administration of justice.
Rather than passively extract legislative intent, the
335. Code of Civil Procedure section 269(a) imposes a duty on the official re-
porter to take down in shorthand oral proceedings, only if requested by either
party or the court. See the cryptic passage from CCRA I concerning what Code
of Civil Procedure section 260(a) requires:
One court has held that section 269 does not require that the official
reporter make the record of superior court proceedings, unless re-
quested by a party or the judge. This conclusion is consistent with the
opinion of the Legislative Counsel holding that section 269 requires
that superior court proceedings be taken down by an official shorthand
reporter if a request is made.
CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 52. (citation omitted).
336. See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
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CCRA I court aggressively imported into the interpretive pro-
cess its own, nineteenth-century vision of the constitutional
relationship between the legislature and the Judicial Council
set forth in Part A of its opinion.
3. What the CCRA I Court Should Have Done
This section illustrates how courts could dynamically in-
terpret statutes relating to court administration, using Cali-
fornia's verbatim court reporting statutes analyzed in CCRA I
as an example. The following analysis is loosely based on a
dialogue between judge and text.
a. Acknowledge that Regulation of the Court Record
is a Core Administrative Concern
The CCRA I court first should have determined whether
the statutes in question implicate core court administration
interests of the judiciary. If the statutes implicate core court
administration interests of the judiciary, the court should
adopt a dynamic interpretation of those statutes that is at-
tuned to the public's interest in the efficient and impartial
administration of justice.
The scope of contemporary judicial branch court admini-
stration has dramatically broadened since the "progressive"
movement's program of a self-governing judiciary that oper-
ates on business management principles removed from the
direct influence of special interests."7
Even before the advent of electronic recording tech-
niques, the efficient management of court personnel, includ-
ing court reporters and the court record, were core adminis-
trative concerns of the judiciary."38 These interests have only
grown stronger as advanced electronic recording technology
provide court administrators with management tools to more
efficiently and effectively utilize court reporters, address per-
sonnel problems (such as unavailability of court reporters),
337. See supra text accompanying notes 124-125.
338. See Lichter v. County of Monmouth, 276 A.2d 382, 386 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1970) (stating that court reporters are "essential nonjudicial officers over whom
the court must exercise control and without whom it could not properly func-
tion" and citing "other jurisdictions [that] likewise recognize that court report-
ing is an administrative matter and that its supervision is routinely administra-
tive"). See also Bloom v. Crosson, 590 N.Y.S.2d 328, 330 (App. Div. 1992); see
also O'Coins, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worcester, 287 N.E.2d 608 (Mass. 1972).
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and manage courts' budgets.
Cost-effective utilization of verbatim recording resources
and personnel management problems with court reporters
continue to drive the rapid proliferation of electronic verbatim
recording technology in the courts.339 In California, and na-
tionally, shortages of qualified shorthand reporters have
closed courts and delayed appeals over the past few dec-
ades.34 ° Budget crises have also sent court administrators
scurrying for ways to achieve efficiencies in court operations,
including electronic recording technologies.341 The rational
deployment of sophisticated technology requires a deft ad-
ministrative touch. Court administrators need flexibility to
339. See Daniel H. Huyett, III, Management of Federal Court Reporters, 99
F.R.D. 243, 245 (1983) (recounting serious "court reporter problems" plaguing
federal courts that prompted the General Accounting Office to recommend that
"electronic recording systems be used as the primary court reporting method").
See also Ruth Marcus, End Suggested to Court Report Use; Tape Recording Seen
As Less Costly, NAT'L L.J., July 27, 1981, at 3; Hewitt, supra note 24, at 4.
One or more of the following reasons.., will be mentioned [by judges
when explaining why they sought alternatives to traditional shorthand
reporting]: (1) there was a shortage of qualified court reporters and
finding alternatives became a necessity; (2) there was a problem with
timeliness of transcripts, quality of transcripts, or both; (3) there was a
financial crisis and the court had to save money. In short, trial judges
adopt video reporting because of problems with the status quo, not be-
cause they have determined that videotape is inherently a better form
of record.
Id.
340. See, e.g., Judge Threatens to Jail Court Reporter, L.A. DAILY J., June,
13, 1986, at 22 ("There's a real crunch. A lot of demand for their services and
not enough court reporters to go around," quoting Burdett Harris, the director of
Los Angeles Superior Court Staff Services). See also Reporter Shortage Closes
Alameda Courts: Judges Forced to Juggle Calendars with No Immediate Solu-
tion in Sight, S.F. RECORDER, Dec. 7, 1988; Court Reporter Shortage Plagues
State, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 10, 1989, at 4.
341. See Brian Miller, Court Reporting: From Stenography to Technology,
GOV'T TECH. 1, Mar. 1996, at 1 ("Overloaded and underfunded courts are in-
creasingly looking at audio recording as a way to cut costs, which is achieved
mainly by eliminating the salaries and related costs of court reporters."); see
also Hudzik, supra note 8, at 1868-69.
[Wihen fiscal constraint is seen more as an ongoing, long-range condi-
tion, not merely a dip in a cycle, fundamental organizational behaviors
must change in order to increase organizational effectiveness and sur-
vival. This is the environment the California courts will probably face
for the next decade, an environment that requires transformational
rather than translational behaviors.... Instead of returning to busi-
ness as usual, organizations transform the ways they provide services.
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effectively utilize rapidly developing technologies.342 Legisla-
tive micro-management of technology utilization, often at the
urging of special interest groups, paralyzes the administra-
tive function of the courts.3 43 By giving individual superior
courts the discretion to utilize electronic recording, the Judi-
cial Council's Electronic Recording Rules exemplified the cur-
rent trend towards decentralized management, which "maxi-
miz[es] the managerial flexibility given to individual trial
courts to manage their funds."344
b. Focus on the Text of Each Statute, Giving Words
Their Ordinary Meaning
Having determined that verbatim recording statutes im-
plicate core administrative concerns, the court should con-
tinue the dynamic interpretation process by focusing on the
text of each statute, giving words their ordinary meaning.
Both the Fifth District Court of Appeal's LACCRA opinion
and the superior court's opinion in CCRA I illustrate how the
court reporting statutes can be narrowly construed by focus-
ing on the literal words of the text of these statutes.
The LACCRA opinion upheld the practice of the Los An-
geles Superior Court to use electronic recording technology to
make the record of proceedings where neither the judge nor
the parties requested an official court reporter. Narrowly in-
terpreting Code of Civil Procedure section 269(a), the court
held: "[Section 2691 does not mandate that the official re-
porter report all the listed events. It requires instead that
the official reporter 'take down' civil proceedings only if re-
quested by either party or the judge; the official reporter need
not 'take down' a record when no request is made."45
The LACCRA court also narrowly interpreted the text of
the two code sections that expressly authorize electronic re-
cording under limited circumstances: Code of Civil Procedure
section 270 (which authorized the demonstration project) and
Government Code section 72194.5 (which authorizes elec-
342. See Henry H. Feritt, Jr., Video Depositions, Transcripts and Trials, 43
EMoRY L.J. 1071, 1092-93 (1994).
343. See Anderson et al., supra note 36, at 1790.
344. Hudzik, supra note 8, at 1889. "[Elfficiency and effectiveness can be im-
proved substantially by increasing the power and authority of line managers to
use their resources." Id. at 1890.
345. Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 341, 344 (Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added).
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tronic recording in municipal courts where an official reporter
is unavailable). The LACCRA court interpreted the text of
Code of Civil Procedure section 270 as simply overriding Code
of Civil Procedure section 269(a), concluding: "[als with sec-
tion 269, nothing in section 270 or the proposed modification
proscribed the use of electronic recording where no request for
an official verbatim record was made."3"
The LACCRA court's interpretation of Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 270 is in accord with an Informal Opinion of
the California Attorney General's Office:
Nothing in section 270 indicates that the Legislature in-
tended to limit the authority of the courts or departments
not engaged in the demonstration project to provide for a
record of its proceedings which may be authorized by other
provisions of law .... We conclude that there is no re-
quirement for the attendance of a court reporter in any
superior court proceeding except a criminal proceeding
and a juvenile court proceeding before a juvenile court
judge in the absence of a request by a party or an order of
the court.347
Similarly, the LACCRA court narrowly interpreted the
text of Government Code section 72194.5 as merely overrid-
ing Code of Civil Procedure section 274c, "the municipal and
justice court analogue to section 269," concluding:
That the Legislature has allowed electronic recording in
lieu of shorthand reporting in municipal and justice courts
when shorthand reporting would otherwise be required by
section 274c [i.e., where requested by a party or the court]
346. Id. at 345.
Thus, section 270 permitted the use of electronic recording devices in
the demonstration courtrooms in place of the services of an official re-
porter in those instances where section 269 would otherwise have re-
quired that a verbatim record be taken by an official reporter, that is,
where the judge or a party requested such a record.
Id.
347. Letter from Jack R. Winkler, Assistant Attorney General, Chief of
Opinion Unit, Office of John K. Van De Kamp, Attorney General, to Frank S.
Zolin, County Clerk and Executive Officer, Superior Court for Los Angeles
County (Jan. 4, 1989) (responding to "a request for an Attorney General's opin-
ion on behalf of the judges of the Personnel and Budget Committee of the Los
Angeles County Superior Court") (emphasis added). The legislative history of
Government Code section 72194.5 supports this narrow construction; each ver-
sion of SB 629 referred solely to municipal courts and addressed the unavail-
ability of court reporters in municipal courts. SB 629 did not place the issue of
electronic recording in superior court before the Legislature.
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does not suggest to us that the Legislature intended to
prohibit electronic reporting of civil matters in superior
courts when shorthand reporting is not required under
section 269.48 Addressing the legislature's failure may
enact AB 1854 as originally proposed, which would have
authorized the superior court "to order the verbatim rec-
ord of oral proceedings in that court to be made electroni-
cally,"349 the LACCRA opinion states: "The Legislature's
rejection of the proposed amendment means only that the
superior courts continue to lack statutory authority to
substitute electronic recording for shorthand reporting
when shorthand reporting is required by virtue of section
269, that is, upon request of either party or the court."
35 0
The LACCRA court also rejected the applicability of all
the other statutes cited by the Los Angeles court reporters-
and relied upon by the CCRA I court to support its statutory
scheme:
None of the other statutes cited by the [Los Angeles court
reporters] association are of consequence .... These stat-
utes are perfectly compatible with section 269. They all
either relate to the office of official reporter for purposes of
section 269 or apply when a request is made in a civil case
for the services of an official reporter within the scope of
section 269. If no such request is made, these statutes, like
269, are inapplicable.35'
The LACCRA court held, relying solely on textual analy-
sis, the following:
We therefore arrive at a very narrow holding: the court is
not prohibited, by any explicit or implicit legislative com-
mand contained in those specific statutes cited by the as-
sociation, from choosing to maintain a record of general
civil proceedings by means of electronic recording devices
where neither the court nor any party requests that a ver-
batim record be taken by an official shorthand reporter
pursuant to the provisions of section 269. We go no fur-
ther than this circumscribed conclusion: in particular, we
348. Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 341, 347 (Ct. App. 1995). The Informal Opinion of the California At-
torney General's Office also supports LACCRA's narrow interpretation of GOV'T
CODE. §72194.5. See infra note 361.
349. A.B. No. 1854 (Cal. 1989) (watering down into an extension of the "dem-
onstration" project in response to CCRA opposition). See supra note 551.
350. LACCRA, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347 (emphasis added).
351. Id. at 347-48 (emphasis added).
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do not decide the purposes, if any, for which the generated
electronic recording may be used, because this question is
outside the scope of the discrete issue presented by the as-
sociation's petition and evidence.352
The trial court's opinion in the CCRA I case interprets
the text of the verbatim reporting statutes, without reference
to legislative history, even more narrowly than the LACCRA
court by rearranging the order in which it reviews the code
sections. The court begins its review of the code sections with
Government Code section 69941,"' 3 rather than Code of Civil
Procedure section 269(a) as did the appellate courts in
CCRA I and LACCRA. Though supported by legislative his-
tory,354 the trial court's rearrangement of these code provi-
sions, based solely on the text of the statute, encompasses the
most natural reading of statutory text.
All other court reporting statutes, including Code of Civil
Procedure section 269(a),355 flow from Government Code sec-
tion 69941, which authorizes-but does not require-superior
courts to appoint an official court reporter. Under this nar-
row interpretation, completely justified by statutory text alone,
the superior courts do not require legislative authorization to
use electronic recording because the legislature has not occu-
pied the field of verbatim recording in superior court. No
statute displaces the authority of the courts-inherent or un-
der article VI, section 6-to decide how best to make the ver-
batim record or, in civil cases, to decide not to make available
any verbatim recording technology.356 The statutory option to
appoint an official reporter is not equivalent to a statutory
exclusion of all other options-unless the statute expressly
provides. No statute expressly precludes superior courts from
utilizing electronic recording technology to make the record.
Under the trial court's interpretation, superior courts
352. Id. at 349-50.
353. Statement of Intended Decision at 11, CCRA I, supra note 1.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27.
355. "Concerning duties of official reporters so appointed pursuant to 69941,
Code of Civil Procedure section 269 provides .... ." Statement of Intended Deci-
sion at 11, CCRA I, supra note 1.
356. In criminal cases, due process rights of the defendant require a suffi-
cient record for appeal. In civil cases, the parties would have to make their own
arrangements with private court reporter services, as they do in depositions and
as they did in federal court until 1940. See Henry P. Chandler, Some Major Ad-
vances in the Federal Judicial System: 1922-1947, 31 F.R.D. 307, 436 (1963).
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have no duty to make available an official reporter to a party.
Code of Civil Procedure section 269(a) does not require a su-
perior court to make "available" a sufficient number of official
court reporters to accommodate demand (or any official re-
porters, for that matter). The Judicial Council's Electronic
Recording Rules did not conflict, therefore, with section
269(a), or any other statute, because they authorized superior
courts to use electronic recording as a means of making the
official verbatim record "when an official reporter ... is un-
available" or "when the parties proceed with a hearing or trial
in the absence of an official reporter ... without objection."
The limited statutory authorization of electronic record-
ing in selected superior courts under the demonstration proj-
ect, and in municipal court under Government Code section
72194.5, does not imply a legislative intent to exclude elec-
tronic recording under any other circumstances.6 7 Under a
literal interpretation of statutory text, express statutory
authorization is not legally required for superior courts to use
electronic verbatim recording technology except where such
use would clearly contravene statute. For this reason, the
legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 270 as an
express exception to Code of Civil Procedure section 269(a).
358
Government Code section 72194.5, authorizing electronic re-
cording in municipal court where an official reporter is un-
available, does not contravene Code of Civil Procedure section
274c (the municipal court analogue to section 269(a)). Thus,
the Judicial Council could have authorized such use of elec-
tronic recording through its own rule-making power."'
357. The CCRA I court stated:
"The fact that the Legislature has by statute authorized electronic re-
cording in some contexts suggests strongly that-unless the existing
statutory scheme providing for the official record to be taken down in
shorthand is amended-the Legislature does not intend that electronic
recording of superior court proceedings be the method of creating an of-
ficial record.
California Court Reporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44,
55 (Ct. App. 1995), affd, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997).
358. "Notwithstanding Section 269 .... " CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 270 (West
Supp. 1998).
359. The Judicial Council's request for legislative authorization was limited
to addressing the problem of court reporter unavailability in municipal courts,
and did not include the use of electronic recording in superior courts. Letter
from Jon D. Smock, Asst. Dir. Legislation, Judicial Council, to Gov. Brown
(Sept. 5, 1975) (court reporters are "not available in over one half of all munici-
pal court proceedings").
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c. Study Each Statute's Text in Light of "Its
Legislative History, Its Purpose(s), and the
Evolution of Its Purpose(s) Over Time"
The trial court's interpretation reinforces the history of
Government Code section 69941 and Code of Civil Procedure
section 269(a), both of which derived from the same statute.
The text of these code sections has remained substantially the
same through many minor amendments and codifications
over 130 years. The interpreting court needs to interpret
these statutes in light of the enacting legislature's technologi-
cal and cultural context as part of the court's dialogue with
the language of the statute.
The California Legislature enacted Chapter 434 of the
California Statutes of 1861, the progenitor of Government
Code section 69941 and Code of Civil Procedure sections
269(a) and 273, in the context of a frontier society, when court
reporting was in its infancy. Enacted during the high-noon of
the Field Code, when courts looked to legislatures to satisfy
their rudimentary administrative needs,3"' the legislature of-
fered the courts and litigants the option of utilizing a cutting-
edge technology-verbatim shorthand reporting-by author-
izing each court to hire an official court reporter.
Chapter 434 was an option-expanding statute, designed
to make available upon demand a quality source of a rela-
tively new verbatim recording technology. The 1861 enacting
legislature could not have meant to authorize only shorthand
reporting since there was no other verbatim recording tech-
nology available. This statute did not comprise a mandatory
scheme for making the official verbatim record because no
statute required (or requires) the making of an official verba-
tim record.
In the twentieth century, verbatim recording technology
evolved dramatically, along with the expanding role and
needs of court administration. Court administration in-
creasingly utilizes information-age technology to achieve effi-
ciencies and to tailor the delivery of justice to the needs of
consumers. Existing statutes do not impair the courts'
authority to utilize alternative verbatim recording technolo-
gies. However, to the extent that courts would benefit from a
uniform statewide policy regarding the use of electronic re-
360. See WHEELER, supra note 10, at 11.
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cording to make the record, existing statutes do not provide
such a policy for superior courts. In jurisdictions like Califor-
nia and New York, the legislative branch is incapable of per-
forming this updating function because of interest group
pressure. The California Judicial Council's invalidated Elec-
tronic Recording Rules were an attempt to provide a state-
wide policy regarding the use of electronic recording in Cali-
fornia superior courts.
Following a dynamic interpretation approach, the Cali-
fornia courts should narrowly interpret the verbatim report-
ing statutes to allow the Judicial Council, and local superior
courts, to update court administration rules to keep pace with
modern technology.
The failure of the legislature to update the verbatim re-
cording statutes to authorize electronic recording in superior
courts provides no evidence of a contemporary collective leg-
islative intent to prohibit the Judicial Council from exercising
its supplemental rule-making authority to authorize elec-
tronic recording in superior courts. The enactment of Gov-
ernment Code section 72194.5 addressed the problem of a
dearth of official reporters in municipal courts only: electronic
recording in superior courts was not an issue in the adoption
of the bill.36' Further, the demonstration project in selected
superior courts was not the product of a rational, deliberative
decision that electronic recording was not reliable enough to
make the record in superior courts. Legislative history shows
that the project was the product of a compromise forced by
the CCRA's opposition to an unqualified authorization of elec-
tronic recording in superior court.362
361. See California Attorney General Office Informal Opinion, from Jack
Winkler, Ass't. Attorney General, Chief of Opinion Unit, to Frank S. Zolin,
County Clerk, Executive Officer, Superior Court, Los Angeles County (Jan. 4,
1989).
By specifically authorizing municipal and justice courts to use elec-
tronic recording when court reporters were not available in Govern-
ment Code section 72194.5 it might be inferred that the Legislature in-
tended to deny such authority to other courts. However, since
enactment of that section was based on an expressed legislative finding
of a shortage of court reporters in some municipal and justice courts
there is no basis for inferring legislative intent with respect to other
courts for which no legislative finding was made.
Id. at 4.
362. See supra text accompanying notes 48-64. See also Eskridge, Politics
Without Romance, supra note 147, at 287-88.
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Also, legislative failure to update the verbatim reporting
statutes should not be used by the interpreting court to pre-
clude the use of electronic recording, as such technology
clearly was not contemplated by the enacting legislature in
1861.
An important formal problem with most of the
legislative inaction cases is that they are inconsistent
with the traditional proposition that the legislative
"intent" relevant to statutory interpretation is the in-
tent of the enacting [legislature], not the continuing
intent of subsequent [legislature's] .... Formally, the
job of [a legislature] ends when it passes the statute,
and "it is the function of the courts and not the Legis-
lature, much less a Committee of one House of the
Legislature, to say what an enacted statute means."363
A narrow interpretation of the verbatim recording statutes
forces the legislature to expressly-and authoritatively-de-
clare its intent to deprive the Judicial Council of the power to
authorize electronic recording in superior courts.
Such an interpretation is also faithful to the option-
creating purpose of the enacting legislature in 1861 to enable
California courts to take advantage of cutting-edge verbatim
recording technology. The post of official court reporter was
designed to address the problem of unavailability of qualified
court reporters, a problem that challenges judicial adminis-
trators today.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts that follow the traditional legislative intent ap-
proach to statutory interpretation have one foot mired in the
past while the other-administrative-foot moves toward the
future. Both feet will stride in the same direction when
courts abandon outdated notions of legislative supremacy in
the field of court administration.
In CCRA I, the court of appeal wrought a major shift in
the balance of power in court administration in California
under the guise of "just following orders." Purporting to fol-
low state supreme court precedent, the appellate court
broadly construed an ambiguous phrase--"not inconsistent
363. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Symposium: Patterson v. McClean: Interpret-
ing Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 95 (1988).
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with statute"-to cut back the Judicial Council's rule-making
power over practice, procedure, and court administration.
Under the guise of legislative intent, the court invented an
implied statutory scheme that suggests the legislature's in-
tent to ban electronic recording from superior courts until fur-
ther notice. The result was a poorly reasoned decision with
potentially devastating consequences for court administration
in California.
Courts need to openly acknowledge their role in articu-
lating the constitutional value of a balance of power in court
administration and openly endeavor to promote a vigorous
and independent administrative role for the courts.
